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ABSTRACT
While the scenery of Division I College Football has long 
reflected that of a professional business, its regulation has been 
stuck in an age of amateurism. The players may come and go 
through the years, but the exploitation remains the same. 
Unfortunately, the National Labor Relations Board missed its chance 
to make a lasting mark on this oppressive industry. 
In 2014, members of the Northwestern University football team 
attempted to unionize under their private university. The Board, 
however, dismissed the claim by passing on jurisdiction. The folly of 
this decision was revealed through two of the Board’s subsequent 
decisions. First, in Trustees of Columbia, the Board recognized 
graduate students as statutory employees under the National Labor 
Relations Act, establishing precedent that college students can be 
both students and employees. Next, in Browning-Ferris Industries of 
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 This Comment was written in the interim between the National Labor 
Relations Board’s decision to limit the joint-employment standard in Hy-Brand 
Industries Contractors, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156 slip op. at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017), and its 
subsequent vacation of that decision on February 26, 2018. While that decision 
impacts this Comment’s applicability, it also fortunately reopens the door to the 
original premise of this Comment: that Division I college football players are joint 
employees of their schools and the NCAA, respectively. This Comment further 
provides unique insight into how a restrictive joint-employment standard eliminates 
this argument. Finally, being that the NLRB has altered its approach to joint 
employment three times in the past two and a half years, this Comment remains 
relevant for future joint-employment jurisprudence.
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California, Inc., the Board made the joint-employment standard more 
inclusive. These decisions opened the door for a persuasive
argument by Division I College Football players that they are 
employees under the NLRA, with the NCAA acting as a joint
employer. 
With the changing political climate, however, this potential 
argument has fallen to the wayside. The current Board has reverted 
back to a more restrictive standard of joint employment, and the 
changes will likely continue. In all, the Board missed its chance to 
protect some of the most vulnerable employees—college football 
players.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 17, 2015, the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB or the Board) faced fourth and one on its opponent’s thirty-
five yard line, and it decided to punt.1 When considering a workplace 
landscape that has been characterized by some as a farce label of 
amateurism and analogized to slavery,2 the Board decided in 
Northwestern University that asserting jurisdiction “would not serve 
to promote stability in labor relations”3 among collegiate football 
athletes, the schools, and the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA).4 In puzzling fashion, the Board recognized that 
major college football does have extensive similarities to 
professional sports,5 while at the same time granting the petitioning 
1. See Sheldon D. Pollack & Daniel V. Johns, Northwestern Football 
Players Throw a “Hail Mary” but the National Labor Relations Board Punts: 
Struggling to Apply Federal Labor Law in the Academy, 15 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
77, 109 (2015). 
2. See, e.g., Richard T. Karcher, Broadcast Rights, Unjust Enrichment, 
and the Student-Athlete, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 107, 111 (2012); César F. Rosado 
Marzán & Alex Tillett-Saks, Work, Study, Organize!: Why the Northwestern 
University Football Players Are Employees Under the National Labor Relations 
Act, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 301, 304 (2015); Robert A. McCormick & Amy 
Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as 
Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 157 (2006); Maria L. Ontiveros, NCAA Athletes, 
Unpaid Interns and the S-Word: Exploring the Rhetorical Impact of the Language of 
Slavery, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1657, 1666.
3. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 17, 
2015).
4. See id. at 5. The Board acknowledged the extensive degree of control 
the NCAA has over member institutions, asserting that the “NCAA now exercises a 
substantial degree of control over the operations of individual member teams, 
including many of the terms and conditions under which the scholarship players (as 
well as walk-on players) practice and play the game.” Id.
5. See id. at 4-5 (identifying that “FBS football does resemble a 
professional sport in a number of relevant ways”).
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workers6 none of the benefits long possessed by professional 
athletes.7 Therefore, without considering the inequities, the Board 
simply used its statutory authority to avoid deciding the case on its 
merits.8
Nevertheless, Board members appointed by President Obama9
issued corresponding decisions and analyses10 that hinted at a 
shifting perspective toward college football athletes, opening the 
path for a unique unionization attempt under the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).11 In Trustees of Columbia, the Board deemed 
student assistants at Columbia University to be statutory employees 
under § 2 of the NLRA.12 Subsequently, in January 2017, the then-
6. It must be recognized that the Board never actually established the 
football players as contractual employees, but rather provided that even if they were, 
passing on jurisdiction was the correct approach. See id. at 1. 
7. See Phil Thompson, State of the Unions . . . in Professional Sports, CHI. 
TRIB. (Jan. 19, 2015, 8:48 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/ct-spt-0120-
state-of-the-unions-20150119-story.html [https://perma.cc/BY2G-SUJJ]. 
8. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 3 (declining to exercise jurisdiction). 
9. See Who We Are, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are 
[https://perma.cc/YWY2-MA4S] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). There are five NLRB 
Board members, each of whom being appointed by the President and having a five-
year term. Id. With one Board member’s term expiring each year, the incumbent 
President has significant influence over the partisanship and perspective of the 
Board. See Members of the NLRB Since 1935, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-
we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 [https://perma.cc/YCB8-E2QU] (last visited Mar. 
5, 2018) (detailing the shift of partisanship over the Board’s lifespan). See also
Daniel Wiessner, AFL-CIO, Affiliates Set to Challenge Recent NLRB Rulings,
REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/labor-aflcio/afl-cio-
affiliates-set-to-challenge-recent-nlrb-rulings-idUSL1N1OR0DD 
[https://perma.cc/X2Q3-TBY2] (articulating the different manners in which the 
Trump administration’s appointments to the NLRB have reversed the decisions of 
Barack Obama appointments to the NLRB). 
10. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 
slip op. at 1-2 (Aug. 23, 2016); see also Memorandum GC 17-01 from Richard F. 
Griffin, Jr., General Counsel on the Statutory Rights of University Faculty and 
Students in the Unfair Labor Practice Context 1, 16 (Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter 
Internal Memorandum] (concluding “that scholarship football players in Division I 
FBS private sector colleges and universities are employees under the NLRA, with 
the rights and protections of that Act”). While this memorandum has since been 
withdrawn by the NLRB, its analysis is nevertheless persuasive and applicable.
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2016). See also Jay D. Lonick, Note, 
Bargaining with the Real Boss: How the Joint-Employer Doctrine Can Expand 
Student-Athlete Unionization to the NCAA as an Employer, 15 VA. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 135, 137 (2015) (describing student–athletes’ potential claim of joint 
employment against the NCAA under the NLRA). 
12. Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 1, 2 (defining student assistants as 
“students who perform services at a university in connection with their studies”). In 
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acting NLRB General Counsel issued an advisory opinion 
articulating that, in light of recent cases, Division I Football 
Subdivision (FBS) scholarship athletes of private universities are 
employees under the NLRA.13
The Board further provided, although inadvertently, a plausible 
response to its principal concern in Northwestern University that the 
NLRA does not apply to public entities, including public 
universities.14 Because the NLRA does not apply to state universities, 
the Board would not have been able to exercise jurisdiction over 
college football players at 108 of the 125 FBS institutions,15 thereby 
rendering the rationales of Trustees of Columbia and the former 
General Counsel moot.16 However, four days after deciding 
Northwestern University, the Board expanded its joint-employment 
standard in Browning Ferris Industries.17 This decision stimulated a 
doing so, the Board overturned a foundation case in Brown University, 342 
N.L.R.B. 483 (2004). See id. at 1.
13. See Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 16. While this opinion was 
seismic in persuasion, it lacked any binding effect on the Board and is subject to 
irrelevance because of the presidential change. See Lester Munson, NLRB Rules
Football Players at Private FBS Schools Are Employees, ESPN (Feb. 3, 2017), 
http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/18612851/nlrb-rules-football-players-
private-fbs-schools-employees [https://perma.cc/GGV4-NGN7] (detailing how “[a] 
new general counsel, appointed by President Donald Trump [in November 2017], 
could rewrite and reverse this opinion”).
14. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 17, 
2015) (raising the possibility that even if another case arose regarding scholarship 
athletes, the Board might still pass on jurisdiction); Marc Edelman, NLRB Decision 
to Unionize Columbia Student Workers May Help College Athletes’ Union 
Movement, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2016, 2:52 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2016/08/26/nlrb-decision-to-unionize-
columbia-student-workers-may-help-college-athletes-union-
movement/#623a12766962 [https://perma.cc/JTJ3-5K5J] (articulating that “the 
Columbia University decision does not help college athlete organizers directly with 
the issue about maintaining a ‘symbiotic relationship’ between rival football 
programs”). 
15. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 3 (stating that “the overwhelming 
majority of competitors are public colleges and universities over which the Board 
cannot assert jurisdiction”). Broadly, the FBS is where revenue-generating college 
football is played. See Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivision 
Classification, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/
divisional-differences-and-history-multidivision-classification [https://perma.cc/
48HV-AQYZ] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
16. For rationale that is rendered moot, see Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. 
at 5; Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 16-23 (describing how FBS football 
players conform to the statutory definition of employee). 
17. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 2 
(Aug. 27, 2015), overruled by Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 
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persuasive argument that FBS college football players are employees 
under a joint-employment theory with the NCAA, a private entity,18
acting as a joint employer, thereby remedying the jurisdictional 
concern.19 However, the Obama-administration-appointed Board 
missed its chance to repair the inequities of college football, and a 
Board with a majority appointed by President Trump returned to a 
more restrictive joint-employment standard on December 14, 2017.20
This Comment will explain the argument that the Obama-
administration Board overlooked: that the cumulative effect of a 
more inclusive standard for student unionization21 and a less-
restrictive joint-employment standard under Browning-Ferris II22
eradicated any jurisdictional concerns and paved the way for the 
recognition of all scholarship FBS college football players as 
statutory employees under the NLRA.23 While Northwestern players’ 
156 slip op. at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Browning-Ferris II]. In Browning-
Ferris II, the Board explained “two or more statutory employers are joint employers 
of the same statutory employees if they ‘share or codetermine those matters 
governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.’” Id. at 2 (quoting 
NLRB. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982)).
18. See NCAA, 2016-17 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 1.1 (2016) 
[hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL]; see also Rachel George, Challenging the 
NCAA; No Longer Is Governing Body Invincible, USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 2013, at 
13C.
19. See Lonick, supra note 11, at 137. The Board even provided 
ammunition for this theory by citing the innate connection the NCAA holds with 
each member institution. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 
4 (stating “[t]here is [] a symbiotic relationship among the various teams, the 
conferences, and the NCAA”). It must be noted, however, that in a September 2016 
Memorandum, the former General Counsel for the Board specifically responded to a 
joint-employer claim against the NCAA by recommending that it should be 
dismissed because it would not “effectuate the policies and purposes of the NLRA to 
issue [a] complaint” against the NCAA. Advice Memorandum from Barry J. 
Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Div. of Advice, NLRB to Peter Sung Ohr, Reg’l Dir. 
Region 13, NLRB 1 n.1 (Sept. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Northwestern Advice 
Memorandum].
20. Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors Ltd., slip op. at 2 (“[W]e
overrule Browning-Ferris and return to the principles governing joint-employer 
status that existed prior to that decision.”).
21. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 
slip op. at 5-7 (Aug. 23, 2016); Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 17 
(referencing the recently adopted broad definition of statutory employee). 
22. Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 2. 
23. See infra Part IV (explaining how a joint-employment claim could have 
remedied the Board’s original concern of exercising jurisdiction over a minority of 
FBS institutions). 
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efforts to unionize have been the subject of a few scholarly articles,24
with one even addressing a joint-employment claim,25 none of them 
dissected why the Board’s decision to pass on jurisdiction in 
Northwestern University was contradicted by subsequent 
jurisprudence.26 This Comment also possesses a unique revisionist 
perspective, assessing how the Obama-administration Board failed to 
rectify the inequality and exploitation of modern major college 
football.27 For over a century, student–athletes have been confined to 
a rigid system of amateurism,28 all while the NCAA has developed 
into the most profitable sports league at any level.29 Now, they are 
stuck in a power structure that denies them a voice and does not 
account for their needs.30
24. See, e.g., Mary Kate Bird, Comment, Northwestern University: Opening 
the Door for Unionization in Collegiate Athletics, 84 UMKC L. REV. 423, 423 
(2015); Marzán & Tillett-Saks, supra note 2, at 301; Pollack & Johns, supra note 1,
at 107; Audrey C. Sheetz, Note, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA: Preserving Amateurism 
in College Sports Amidst the Fight for Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV.
865, 887 (2016).
25. See Lonick, supra note 11, at 137. While Lonick’s Note did address 
joint employment, it did so without analyzing the jurisdictional concerns of the 
Board and made no mention of analogous subsequent jurisprudence. 
26. See infra Part IV. 
27. See Joe Nocera & Ben Strauss, Fate of the Union: How Northwestern 
Football Union Nearly Came to Be, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://www.si.com/college-football/2016/02/24/northwestern-union-case-book-
indentured [https://perma.cc/N68D-2EP6] (detailing how Kain Colter, quarterback 
of Northwestern’s football team and the leading force for unionization, has 
described the NCAA as a “dictatorship” and “cartel”). By not taking swift action on 
a collective bargaining claim by college football athletes, the Obama administration 
Board left the door open for a subsequent Board to issue a case like Hy-Brand 
Industry Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip op. at 4 (Dec. 14, 2017), 
which effectively foreclosed any possible claim of joint employment by college 
football players. See infra Section IV.D. 
28. See Brian L. Porto, Neither Employees Nor Indentured Servants: A New 
Amateurism for a New Millennium in College Sports, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 301, 
306 (2016) (describing the NCAA’s official implementation of amateurism into its 
bylaws in 1916).
29. See Alex Moyer, Note, Throwing Out the Playbook: Replacing the 
NCAA’s Anticompetitive Amateurism Regime with the Olympic Model, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 761, 765 (2015) (stating that “[w]hile these student-athletes struggle 
financially, their work on and off the field helps generate more than $12 billion in 
annual revenue, making college sports more profitable than any professional sports 
league”). 
30. See Nocera & Strauss, supra note 27 (reporting Northwestern 
quarterback Kain Colter’s belief “that the power structure marginalized players and 
that he had deep concerns about issues such as long-term health care for college 
athletes”). 
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Part I of this Comment evaluates the lives of college football 
players, the NCAA’s role as overseer, and scholarly criticisms of the 
allegedly inequitable system.31 Part II explains the Board’s decisions 
in Northwestern University and Trustees of Columbia, its recent 
Internal Memorandum, and the Seventh Circuit’s decision that 
student–athletes are not employees.32 Part III explains the evolution 
of the joint-employment standard under the NLRA, including recent 
inconsistencies.33 Finally, Part IV explains the solution the Obama 
administration missed, that FBS football players were statutory 
employees as a result of joint employment under the NCAA, and 
how this oversight ultimately left players stuck in a farce system of 
amateurism.34
I. THE LIFE OF AN AMATEUR: MODERN COLLEGE FOOTBALL AND 
NCAA CONTROL
As major college football has developed into a highly 
successful and popular enterprise,35 several changes have taken place 
in the lives of the players,36 the NCAA’s degree of regulation,37 and 
the overall outlook on the system.38 Today, FBS football players live 
an onerous lifestyle, spending incredible amounts of time on both 
athletic and academic activities.39 Many of the activities that fill this 
time are regulated by the NCAA, which attempts to maintain a 
uniform system of athletics that is distinct from professionalism 
through its emphasis on amateurism.40 While this goal is considered 
admirable to some, it has not stopped scholars from criticizing the 
methodology of the system.41
31. See infra Part I.
32. See infra Part II.
33. See Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 12-14 (Aug. 
27, 2015), overruled by Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, 
slip op. at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017); see infra Section III.A.  
34. See infra Part IV. 
35. See infra Section I.B (detailing, in part, the high degree of financial 
success that the NCAA has obtained). 
36. See infra Section I.A (describing the demanding lifestyle of college 
football players). 
37. See infra Section I.B (explaining the supervisory role of the NCAA). 
38. See infra Section I.C (outlining the scholarly review of the NCAA’s 
system of amateurism). 
39. See infra Section I.A. 
40. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 1.3.1.
41. See infra Section I.C.
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A. A Day in the Life: Understanding the Demands of Modern FBS 
Football
While some view the lives of modern FBS football players as 
glamorous and covetous,42 in truth they are incredibly hectic.43 In 
addition to being full-time students,44 players dedicate an incredible
amount of time to football-related activities.45 To start, during 
training camp, which lasts almost all of August, players dedicate at 
least fifty to sixty hours per week solely to football.46 Once the 
season actually begins, and with it the academic school year, players 
can expect to spend roughly forty to fifty hours on football-related 
activities.47 This will last the entire first semester, as games are 
generally played weekly from September through November, with 
successful teams playing into January.48 Further, while the rest of the 
student body enjoys a holiday break, the football team uses this time 
to dedicate roughly fifty hours per week in preparation for an 
upcoming postseason game.49
42. See, e.g., Jenna Johnson, Freshman Football Players Balance Stresses 
of College Life, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/education/freshman-football-players-balance-stresses-of-college-
life/2013/12/25/ff5b446a-6673-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html [https://
perma.cc/Y58N-CTPT] (describing the fame college football players immediately 
earn); Sean Zak, From Sunrise to Sunset: The Life of a Student-Athlete, BADGER 
HERALD (Oct. 28, 2013), https://badgerherald.com/sports/2013/10/28/sunrise-sunset-
life-student-athlete/ [https://perma.cc/3NSE-WECA].
43. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 11-15 (Aug. 
17, 2015) (detailing the Northwestern football players’ time commitment to the 
football program in great detail). 
44. The NCAA requires players to be enrolled as full-time students. See 
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, at art. 14.2.
45. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 2 (stating that “[s]cholarship players 
are required to devote substantial hours to football activities”); see also Scooby 
Axson, UCLA QB Josh Rosen: Football and School “Don’t Go Together”, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.si.com/college-football/2017/08/08/josh-
rosen-student-athlete-ncaa-comments [https://perma.cc/7MGH-T2EC].  
46. Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 10.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 11.
49. Id. For example, the season after Northwestern players attempted to 
unionize, they played in the Outback Bowl on January 1, 2016. See Roger Mooney, 
Mistake-Prone Northwestern ‘Not Good Enough to Win’ Against Tennessee, CHI.
TRIB. (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-northwestern-
tennessee-outback-bowl-spt-0102-20160101-story.html [https://perma.cc/BE6U-
73CK]. 
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Even when the season ends, the frantic life of the modern FBS 
football player continues.50 During the off-season, players can expect 
to spend fifteen to twenty hours per week on mandatory football 
activities,51 which likely does not include the extensive time spent 
watching film.52 Once spring finally blossoms, players devote 
roughly twenty to twenty-five hours per week to football activities in 
spring practice.53 After a brief hiatus from football, lasting only a few 
weeks, the return of summer brings with it mandatory workouts, and 
the demanding cycle starts again.54
Therefore, in addition to sustaining a full-time academic 
schedule, FBS football players have the additional burden of 
dedicating as much time to football as one would to a full-time job.55
Legal commentators and scholars of sports law Robert and Amy 
McCormick (the McCormicks) estimate that players dedicate an 
average of forty hours every week to football-related activities,56
with an upward of eighty hours for weeks that culminate in away 
games.57 This translates into players dedicating roughly 262 days per 
year to football.58 When compared to the 250 days per year that the 
50. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 14. One example is a week in 
February labeled “Winning Edge,” whereby “the football coaches separate the 
players into smaller groups and require them to compete with one another in various 
types of demanding competitions to test their levels of conditioning.” Id.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Zac Ellis, Technology in College Football: The Evolution of 
Video and Film Study, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 23, 2015), 
http://www.si.com/college-football/2015/06/24/college-football-technology-video-
film-room [https://perma.cc/BA4V-M3SM] (reporting that “many teams now expect 
[players] to sneak in extra film study during their free time”). 
53. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 14 (describing the period in which 
players engage in practice, film study, and physical conditioning, all of which 
“serves as an opportunity for the players to impress their coaches and move up on 
the depth charts in the various positions they are competing for”).
54. See id. at 15.
55. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 99 n.127 (detailing that 
“between the workouts, practices, games and travel, being a big-time athlete 
amounts to a full-time job and more”) (quoting 60 Minutes: Here’s Ours? (CBS 
television broadcast Jan. 6, 2002), transcript at 17). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. This, of course, is in addition to time spent in class, studying, and 
the mandatory ten hours per week of study hall that players must attend. Id. at 100. 
58. Id. at 103. 
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average American works,59 it becomes even more apparent how 
strenuous the life of a modern FBS football player is.60
While the NCAA characterizes football players as student–
athletes,61 the players’ connection to the school and day-to-day lives 
reveal that their main focus is athletics.62 To start, universities recruit 
football players for their athletic ability, with academic achievements 
being an adjacent necessity.63 In fact, during the recruiting process, 
academic analysis of high school athletes only becomes relevant 
after the coaches determine whether the player could contribute to 
the football team.64
Once enrolled at the university, football continues to be 
paramount.65 Due to their commitments to the football program, FBS 
football players can be denied the opportunity to take afternoon or 
morning classes, depending on the practice schedule.66 The 
commitment to the football program may even dictate what academic 
programs they may pursue.67 For example, Kain Colter, the 
quarterback for Northwestern who led the unionization charge, had 
to forego his pursuit of a pre-med degree due to class scheduling 
59. Id. at 104.
60. See Johnson, supra note 42 (reporting that “top-flight athletes have 
added stresses, like allowing coaches to tightly schedule their lives, consuming 
thousands of calories, making it through practice, staying eligible, establishing a 
reputation on the team, coping with public criticism and being good enough to 
play—or to play eventually”). 
61. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 2.2 (mandating 
“[i]ntercollegiate athletics programs shall be conducted in a manner designed to 
protect and enhance the physical and educational well-being of student-athletes”).
62. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 78 (identifying the 
players as “employee-athletes” instead of student–athletes).  
63. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 15 (Aug. 17, 
2015) (declaring that “scholarship players are identified and recruited in the first 
instance because of their football prowess and not because of their academic 
achievement in high school”). 
64. See id.
65. See Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 
2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-
college-sports/308643/ [https://perma.cc/A6GQ-6TLE] (deconstructing the myth 
that there is a “precedence of scholarship over athletic endeavor”).
66. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 99 n.127. 
67. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 21 (stating how “it is clear that the 
players are controlled to such a degree that it does impact their academic pursuits to 
a certain extent”).
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conflicts.68 Finally, the emphasis on athletics is displayed by the fact 
that if a player quits the team, his scholarship is withdrawn.69
Regardless of this dedication, both the universities football 
players attend and the NCAA exercise unique control over the 
players—to the point where the control is unmatched anywhere else 
in academia or even in the general workplace.70 In fact, major college 
football programs control the players’ dietary habits;71 study habits;72
sleep patterns;73 game day attire;74 living accommodations;75 car 
possession;76 ability to leave campus;77 alcohol consumption;78 media 
communications;79 and use of their names, reputation, and 
popularity.80 The NLRB’s former General Counsel highlighted many 
of these factors in his January 2017 Internal Memorandum.81
68. See id. at 16. 
69. See id. at 21. For example, a player who is routinely tardy for practice 
“may be deemed to have voluntarily withdrawn from the team and will lose his 
scholarship.” See id.
70. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 97. In their article, the 
McCormicks assert “[o]ur data suggest, and other sources confirm, that no other 
university employee is even remotely subject to the degree of control, day by day, 
hour by hour, minute by minute, as the employee-athlete.” See id. at 108. Further, 
they reason that “[t]he exercise of this degree of control over any other employee at 
the university would be unimaginable. Indeed, if any group of persons may be called 
‘employees’ based upon the degree of control exercised by a university, it must be 
the employee-athletes enrolled there.” See id.
71. See Johnson, supra note 42 (detailing that nutritionists tell the players 
what to eat in order to reach an ideal playing weight).
72. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 101 (declaring that 
universities “control [] the location, duration, and manner in which the employee-
athletes carry out . . . academic commitments”).
73. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 15 (describing the daily itinerary for 
players, in which they are expected to be in bed by 10:30 PM). 
74. See id. at 21 (the game day itinerary explains the required dress attire 
for travel days).  
75. See id. (players must disclose and gain approval from the coaching staff 
of where they are going to live). 
76. See id. (explaining how players must “obtain permission from the 
coaches before they can . . . drive personal vehicles”). 
77. See id. (permission is also required for traveling off campus). 
78. See id. 
79. See Northwestern Advice Memorandum, supra note 19, at 1. In this 
memorandum, the NLRB General Counsel’s Office advised that such restrictions on 
social media habits and communications with the media were violative of the 
NLRA. See id. 
80. See Porto, supra note 28, at 311 (describing the regulations prohibiting 
players from using their status for any sort of pay). 
81. See Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 19. Particularly, the former 
General Counsel stated that “there is substantial evidence that colleges and 
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In exchange for relinquishing control over their daily lives, 
extensive time dedication, and physical compromise,82 the players 
are granted a full scholarship to the university.83 This scholarship 
covers the reasonable expenses associated with tuition, fees, room, 
board, and books.84 Nevertheless, the actual costs associated with this 
full scholarship are much lower than the schools’ purported value,85
and players would earn more in a free market.86 Further, while this 
compensation does provide an education, it has not prevented most 
college football players from living below the national poverty line.87
Even in the midst of such conditions, players, unlike their academic 
peers, are denied the right to earn wages as employees or use their 
reputation for profit.88 Largely, the NCAA is the official organization 
that imposes such rules, and many more, upon the players.89
universities control the manner and means of scholarship football players’ work on 
the field and numerous facets of the players’ daily lives to ensure compliance with 
NCAA rules.” See id. He also outlined the NCAA’s extensive use of its control. See 
id. 
82. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 77 n.26. From 1931 to 
2004, roughly 188 college football players died as the result of injuries from the 
sport. Id. This figure does not take into account issues associated with concussions 
down the road. See, e.g., Ben Strauss, Six Concussion Suits Are Filed Against 
Colleges and NCAA, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/sports/ncaafootball/six-head-injury-suits-filed-
in-new-front-against-colleges-and-ncaa.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/75RP-BGQP] 
(referencing both the physical and mental injuries that football causes). 
83. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 2. The Board found the scholarship 
at Northwestern to be worth $61,000. Id.
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 109 n.155; 
Ahmed E. Taha, Are College Athletes Economically Exploited?, 2 WAKE FOREST
J.L. & POL’Y 69, 77 (2012) (recounting that “an athlete does not displace another 
student, so the cost to the college of the athletic scholarship is only the additional 
cost incurred in educating, housing, and feeding the athlete. Because the college has 
excess capacity, this cost is likely very low”).
86. See Taha, supra note 85, at 71.
87. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 79 n.30; Nocera & 
Strauss, supra note 27 (referencing a study that found “more than 80% of athletes 
playing football on ‘full scholarship’ lived below the poverty line” in 2012).
88. See Karcher, supra note 2, at 110 (detailing how student–athletes may 
not market their reputation as high-profile individuals for personal gain, cannot work 
for wages as employees, collectively bargain, or compete in a free market for 
increased payment).  
89. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 5 (stating that the NCAA has the 
authority to “set common rules and standards,” “police and enforce the rules and 
regulations,” and generally “exercises a substantial degree of control over the 
operations of individual member teams”). 
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B. The NCAA’s Role as Supervisor
The NCAA, a non-profit organization, establishes the 
aforementioned rules with a self-declared purpose of upholding the 
integrity of intercollegiate athletics by emphasizing education and 
maintaining the demarcation from professional athletics.90 In pursuit 
of this purpose, the NCAA has rigorously established the importance 
of the label “student–athlete,” which brands the individuals who
perform in athletic events as students first.91 The NCAA created the 
label of student–athlete in response to a collegiate football player 
being awarded worker’s compensation,92 predicting the need to 
protect itself from an employment movement by athletes.93 Six 
decades later, the NCAA is thriving with over 1,200 private and 
public schools, conferences, and affiliate organizations acting as 
members.94
Over this time, the NCAA has overseen the growth of college 
football into a multi-billion dollar industry and a very successful 
business model.95 In fact, the top member institutions that support 
football programs are hugely profitable.96 It has been estimated that 
90. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 1.3.1. More 
specifically, the NCAA holds that its purpose is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics 
as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of
the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between 
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.” Id.
91. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 74-75. The NCAA 
defines student–athlete as: “a student whose enrollment was solicited by a member 
of the athletics staff or other representative of athletics interests with a view toward 
the student’s ultimate participation in the intercollegiate athletics program.” NCAA
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 12.02.13. 
92. See Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457, 464 
(1963) (holding the “record reveals that petitioners established a prima facie case 
for benefits upon the presentation of evidence showing the alleged contract of 
employment”). 
93. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 86 (“The NCAA purposely 
created the term ‘student-athlete’ as propaganda.”).
94. About Us: Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-
are/membership [https://perma.cc/U38Z-DG9Q] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
95. See, e.g., Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The 
Emperor’s New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 495, 509-10 (2008) (detailing how “[t]he NCAA generates enormous revenue 
each year from college sports”).
96. See Alicia Jessop, The Economics of College Football: A Look at the 
Top-25 Teams’ Revenues and Expenses, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2013, 10:32 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2013/08/31/the-economics-of-college-
football-a-look-at-the-top-25-teams-revenues-and-expenses/#6bb125676476 
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intercollegiate athletics is now a $12 billion industry, which exceeds 
any professional sports league.97 Further, the NCAA reported 
revenue of $871.6 million in 2011–2012.98 Specifically, television 
revenues are remarkable, as evidenced by the NCAA’s $7.3 billion 
contract with ESPN for the broadcasting rights to the College 
Football Playoff.99 The Big Ten Conference alone averages $248.2 
million annually in TV contracts,100 with the other “Power Five” 
conferences101 generating similar amounts.102
Further, NCAA member institutions have embraced the 
lucrative environment of college athletics.103 For example, the Big 
Twelve Conference has stated that one of its annual goals is to 
“optimize revenue.”104 Member institutions have further displayed 
remunerative interests through the salaries they pay to their head 
football coaches.105 For example, in 2014, seventy-two head college 
football coaches made over $1 million in salary, with nearly thirty 
earning over $3 million, and the highest paid public employee is a 
college football coach.106
Even with the emergence of FBS football as a massive 
industry, the NCAA has been able to maintain systemic control while 
also delegating the day-to-day control of individual players to 
[https://perma.cc/F42P-EA7Z]. For example, in the 2011–2012 season, long-
established football programs reported the following profits: University of Texas 
($77,917,481); University of Michigan ($61,568,910); University of Alabama 
($45,074,799); and University of Notre Dame ($43,228,691). Id.
97. See Porto, supra note 28, at 308. 
98. Revenue, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances/
revenue [https://perma.cc/C8YK-9Y8X] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
99. Porto, supra note 28, at 310.
100. Id.
101. Rounded out by the Atlantic Coast Conference; the Big 12 Conference; 
the Pac-12 Conference; and the Southeastern Conference.
102. Karcher, supra note 2, at 109 n.1 (reporting that “[t]he conferences have 
their own television contracts with the networks that, depending on the individual 
conference, distribute to each school in the conference on average anywhere from 
$13 million to $21 million annually”).
103. See Eric Snyder, Amateurism and Intercollegiate Athletics,
HIGHEREDJOBS (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.higheredjobs.com/articles/
articleDisplay.cfm?ID=560 [https://perma.cc/KFP6-MK7D].
104. See id.
105. See, e.g., Porto, supra note 28, at 311.
106. Id.; Steve Berkowitz, Christopher Schnaars & Sean Dougherty, NCAA 
Salaries, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/ [https://perma.cc/
CEF5-ZJBH] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
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schools and conferences.107 One example of this control is its 
establishment of limits on the compensation of student–athletes,108 as 
well the terms and content of adjoining agreements.109 The NCAA 
also requires that every student–athlete be enrolled as a full-time 
student at the member institution110 and that they achieve a specified 
GPA to be eligible to play.111 Specific to each sport, the NCAA 
dictates how much time member institutions can allot to practice and 
games.112 Generally speaking, the NCAA sets the rules and standards 
that member institutions must follow to engage in competition.113
Further, the NCAA brazenly polices and punishes individuals 
and member institutions that violate its regulations.114 For example, 
in 2016, the NCAA suspended fourteen players from the Charleston 
Southern University football team for purchasing extra items such as 
pencils, binders, and electronics with their allotted book money.115 In 
2010, it suspended star wide receiver AJ Green for four games for 
selling a game-worn jersey for $1,000 to fund a spring break trip.116
Such punishments for menial infractions are the product of a larger
regulatory scheme of restriction by the NCAA that has been 
routinely criticized.117
107. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 1.2(b) (stipulating 
that one of the NCAA’s purposes is “[t]o uphold the principle of institutional control 
of, and responsibility for, all intercollegiate sports”). 
108. See id. art. 12.02.2 (defining the “actual and necessary expenses” for the 
athletes). 
109. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 2 (Aug. 17, 
2015).
110. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 14.01.2.
111. See id. art. 14.4.3.3.
112. See, e.g., id. art. 17.10 (laying out the practice and games limitations for 
football).
113. Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 4 (“[A]cademic institutions that sponsor 
intercollegiate athletics have banded together and formed the NCAA to, among 
other things, set common rules and standards governing their competitions, 
including those applicable to FBS football.”).
114. See id. (asserting that “[t]he record demonstrates that the NCAA now 
exercises a substantial degree of control over the operations of individual member 
teams”).
115. Ariya A. Massoudi & Perry Kostidakis, BREAKING: Charleston 
Southern Players Suspended vs. FSU, FSUNEWS (Sept. 9, 2016, 3:30 PM), 
http://www.fsunews.com/story/sports/2016/09/08/breaking-30-charleston-southern-
players-suspended/90107172/ [https://perma.cc/C6VW-V3AC].
116. See Porto, supra note 28, at 303.
117. See Christopher Davis, Jr. & Dylan O. Malagrinò, Hold Your Fire: The 
Injustice of NCAA Sanctions on Innocent Student Athletes, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT.
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C. Scholarly Criticism of the NCAA
The NCAA’s questionable sanctioning,118 high degree of 
control,119 incredible revenue,120 and restrictions on athlete 
compensation121 have resulted in regular criticism of its 
organizational structure.122 Particularly, the McCormicks have been 
outspoken critics of the NCAA, arguing that it operates an 
inequitable system.123 They contend that the labels of student–athlete 
and amateur are myths, used only to continue the exploitation of 
athletes by not treating them as employees.124 Specifically, they point 
to the fact that the universities, corporate sponsors, coaches, NCAA, 
and media all benefit from the toils of the players while the workers 
are denied the fruits of this enormous enterprise.125 The McCormicks 
also claim that college football and basketball are decidedly not 
amateur, but inherently commercial, by pointing to three fields of 
law—labor, tax, and antitrust—that the NCAA has utilized to shield
its status of amateurism.126
Professor Richard Karcher, alternatively, suggests that the 
television revenue the NCAA, conferences, and universities earn 
through college football and basketball players constitutes unjust 
enrichment.127 Particularly, Karcher criticizes the fact that, much like 
professional sports leagues, the NCAA is reaping incredible financial 
benefits, while at the same time uniquely avoiding payment for 
L.J. 432, 439-40 (2012); Virginia A. Fitt, Note, The NCAA’s Lost Cause and the 
Legal Ease of Redefining Amateurism, 59 DUKE L.J. 555, 569-70 (2009). 
118. See Davis, Jr. & Malagrinò, supra note 117, at 433-34. 
119. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 4.
120. See supra Section I.B.
121. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 16.01.1.
122. See Ontiveros, supra note 2, at 1665-66, 1668 (detailing many 
commentators’ perspective of a slavery analysis that “focuses upon the lack of 
control that student-athletes have over their lives, as well as the money being made 
by universities off of the athletes’ labor, none of which is given to the workers”). 
123. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 95, at 496-98, 508 
(describing the NCAA as a “tyranny”). 
124. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 73-74 (“The NCAA’s 
purpose in this message [of academics first] is to shore up a crumbling façade, a 
myth in America, that these young athletes in NCAA-member sports programs are 
properly characterized only as ‘student-athletes.’”).
125. See id. at 75-76. 
126. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 95, at 497 (“The idea that major 
college sports are amateur is demonstrably false, and that fallacy has improperly 
sheltered college sports from the application of a variety of laws.”). 
127. See Karcher, supra note 2, at 111.
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labor.128 When considering this discrepancy, Karcher questions the 
morality of the system,129 alleging the NCAA engorges itself on the 
work of the athlete.130
Uniquely, Professor Brian Porto argues that while the NCAA’s 
concept of amateurism is undeniably inequitable, the proper solution 
is modification, not destruction.131 In doing so, however, Porto 
declares that the modern system of collegiate athletics is less about 
preserving tradition or protecting athletes and more about exploiting 
young athletes to avoid labor costs.132 Like many others before 
him,133 Porto highlights the fact that, even with the emergence of 
“unabashed commercialism”134 in the NCAA, the rules of 
amateurism have largely stayed the same for roughly a century.135
In sum, the NCAA oversees a hugely popular and financially 
successful system136 that is supported by the incredible work of its
student–athletes.137 However, the term student–athlete may be just a 
label, as football players invest incredible amounts of time and 
energy into their football programs each week.138 Over the years, the 
hard work of the players has helped to build college football into a 
highly lucrative financial institution.139 Through its supervisory role, 
the NCAA seeks to maintain a system of amateurism, dichotomous 
from professional sports.140 As a result, scholars now routinely label 
128. See id. at 171-72. 
129. Id. at 110-11 (“[A]mateurism principles do not give the NCAA and its 
members a . . . right or justification to be enriched by the portion of the broadcast 
rights fees attributed to the players’ expense and effort (beyond the value of the 
grant-in-aid) that would normally, equitably, and morally be paid to them.”). 
130. See id. at 146 (declaring that the fact that “the NCAA, conferences, and 
universities (and their personnel) continue to engorge at student-athletes’ expense is 
increasingly becoming more unjust”).
131. See Porto, supra note 28, at 304. 
132. See id. at 311-12 (emphasizing that the current restrictions are “petty, 
nonsensical, and even likely to expose athletes to exploitation instead of protecting 
them from it”). 
133. See id. at 302-05. 
134. Id. at 311.
135. See id. at 306-11.
136. See supra Section I.B (describing the vast financial success the NCAA 
has achieved).
137. See supra Section I.A (detailing football players’ incredible dedication 
of time to football-related activities).
138. See supra Section I.A (identifying that football players receive their 
academic scholarships on the basis of athletic achievements). 
139. See supra Section I.B. 
140. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 136-37.
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the system as exploitive and inequitable.141 It is this exploitive and 
inequitable system that acted as a guidepost for Northwestern 
football players in their attempt to collectively bargain.142
II. THE BOARD’S APPROACH TO COLLEGIATE UNIONIZATION 
EFFORTS
While the Northwestern football players’ unionization attempt 
was unprecedented in collegiate athletics, the Board has been 
confronted with unionization efforts connected to universities 
before.143 However, due in part to the political fluctuation within the 
Board,144 its response to such attempts has been inconsistent, and it 
has repeatedly switched tracks in its decisions over the past forty-
five years.145 Therefore, the Board’s seemingly inconsistent decisions 
in Northwestern University146 and Trustees of Columbia147 conform 
to the Board’s muddled history.148
A. The Roles and Responsibilities of the Board
As an independent government agency, the Board makes labor 
decisions in pursuit of its purpose to enforce the National Labor 
Relations Act.149 In enforcing the NLRA, the Board is called to 
protect the rights of powerless private employees by according them 
the right to utilize group negotiation to improve wages and working 
141. See supra Section I.C (identifying several different arguments from 
scholars as to why the current system of amateurism in the NCAA is inequitable, 
exploitative, or violative). 
142. See infra Section II.C.
143. See infra Section II.B (describing the cases related to unionization 
efforts linked to universities).  
144. See Members of the NLRB, supra note 9. For example, in Brown 
University, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (2004), three Republican Board members held 
that student assistants were not statutory employees, while two Democrat Board 
members dissented. In contrast, in Trustees of Columbia in the City of New York,
364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 23, 2016), a Democrat-majority Board 
overturned Brown, with the lone Republican dissenting. 
145. See infra Sections II.B-D.  
146. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 17, 
2015).
147. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 2.
148. See infra Section II.B.
149. See Introduction to the NLRB, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb-
introduction [https://perma.cc/832W-G2DL] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
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conditions.150 Consequently, the Board’s duty is to further the 
protection of workers’ rights in the private sector.151 In practice, 
however, effectuating this purpose in line with the complexities of 
the modern workforce is difficult, entitling the Board to judicial 
deference152 and the ability to pass on exercising jurisdiction if it 
does not believe the policies of the NLRA would be furthered by a 
decision.153
B. The Muddled History of Student Unionization Efforts
One particular modern labor complexity that the Board has 
addressed multiple times is unionization by college students.154 In 
each case, the major issue was whether the particular individuals in 
focus were employees under the NLRA.155 Largely, in determining 
this issue, the Board looked to one factor—the common-law 
definition of employee.156 In turn, a common-law employee is one 
“who performs services for another under a contract of hire, subject 
to the other’s control or right of control, and in return for 
payment.”157
Due to the NLRA’s focus on private institutions,158 past student 
unionization efforts have been connected to private, non-profit 
150. See Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: The NLRB Was Wrong to 
Deny Northwestern Football Players Union Status, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2015, 4:02 PM) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2015/09/02/upon-further-review-the-
nlrb-was-wrong-to-deny-northwestern-football-players-union-status/#70f7ca52c941 
[https://perma.cc/37AK-LMJ7].
151. See National Labor Relations Act, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/
resources/national-labor-relations-act [https://perma.cc/EMF4-LSSP] (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2018). 
152. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975).
153. See, e.g., Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 3 (Aug. 
17, 2015); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 
(1951). 
154. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 93-96 (describing the 
Board’s approach toward unionization efforts connected to universities and 
colleges).
155. See id. at 90. 
156. See id. at 91 (stating “Congress . . . emphatically endorsed the common 
law right of control test as the proper measure of statutory coverage”). 
157. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 n.27 (2004), overruled by Trs. of 
Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 23, 
2016) (rejecting Brown’s requirement of a primarily academic relationship, but still 
keeping the definition of common law employee). 
158. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2016).
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universities.159 While the Board allows private university faculty 
members to collectively bargain,160 it has been unpredictable with 
graduate students’ rights to collectively bargain.161 This 
inconsistency follows the Board’s political composition, with 
Republican-majority Boards rejecting student assistants’ attempts to 
unionize and Democrat-controlled Boards subsequently allowing 
such collective bargaining.162
Initially, a Republican-majority163 Board rejected both graduate 
students’164 and student clinicians’165 attempts to collectively bargain
in four cases in the 1970s, citing the claimants’ status as “primarily 
students.”166 However, when controlled by President Clinton’s 
Democrat appointees from 1999 and 2000,167 the Board switched 
course in two cases, finding that clinicians and certain graduate 
students were employees under the common-law employee control 
test and therefore entitled to protection under the NLRA.168
Nevertheless, a Republican board169 retreated once again in Brown 
159. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 2 (declaring “[t]he Board has 
exercised jurisdiction over private, nonprofit universities for more than 45 years”).
160. See id. (stating that “the Board has permitted collective bargaining by 
faculty members at private universities and has had frequent occasion to apply the 
Act in the university setting”).
161. See id. at 2-5 (describing how its approach has varied over the past 
forty-five years). Collective bargaining is largely equivalent to unionization. See §
158(d). 
162. See Members of the NLRB Since 1935, supra note 9. The party in 
control when each student assistant case was decided was, without failure, 
Republican in instances of denial of collective bargaining and Democrat where 
collective bargaining was approved. See id. 
163. See id. (showing the Republican Party’s majority status on the board). 
164. See Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1974); 
Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972) (rejecting an attempt by graduate 
students to join faculty members in collectively bargaining).
165. See St. Claire’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1004 (1977) 
(reaffirming “collective bargaining should not be applied to what is fundamentally 
an educational relationship”); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 251 (1976) 
(holding “interns, residents, and clinical fellows . . . are not ‘employees’ within the 
meaning of . . . the Act”). 
166. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. at 623. 
167. See Members of the NLRB Since 1935, supra note 9.
168. See N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1206 (2000) (“[G]raduate 
assistants are not within any category of workers that is excluded from the definition 
of ‘employee’ in Section 2(3).”); Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 152 
(1999) (deciding to overturn past fundamental cases and find “the interns, residents, 
and fellows employed by BMC, while they may be students learning their chosen 
medical craft, are also ‘employees’ within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act”).
169. See Members of the NLRB Since 1935, supra note 9.
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University170 and created a new standard171 that required the 
satisfaction of two components: (1) the common-law control test and 
(2) the relationship between the graduate students and the university 
be predominantly economic and not academic.172 At the time the 
Board considered Northwestern University173 and Trustees of 
Columbia,174 this was the applicable standard.
C. The Decision to Punt in Northwestern University
The Board made a straightforward decision in Northwestern 
University175—it simply decided not to decide.176 This decision 
stemmed out of an attempt by Northwestern football players to 
unionize in January 2014, a decision that was inspired by their desire 
to utilize collective bargaining to combat the ostensible inequality of 
the NCAA’s amateurism system.177 After all, these players devoted 
substantial amounts of time to football activities, were full-time 
students at a rigorous academic institution,178 and were still forced to 
sign a release allowing Northwestern and the NCAA to use their 
name, likeness, and images for any reason.179 Further, the team and 
its players were subject to the multitude of restrictions that the 
school, the Big Ten Conference, and the NCAA imposed.180
170. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 (2004), overruled by Trs. of 
Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 23, 
2016)
171. See id. at 483, 491.
172. See id. at 488; see also McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 92-
96.
173. Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 8 (Aug. 17, 
2015).
174. Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 1.
175. Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 3. 
176. See id. at 2 (holding that “asserting jurisdiction in this case would not 
serve to promote stability in labor relations”). The stability the Board mentioned was 
in reference to the member institutions, their conferences, and the NCAA. See id. 
177. See Nocera & Strauss, supra note 27, at 2 (explaining the decision to 
file, quarterback Kain Colter asserted that the “current model resembles a 
dictatorship, where the NCAA places these rules and regulations on these students 
without their input or without their negotiation”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
178. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 3; see also supra Section I.A.
179. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 10.  
180. See id. at 9-13. For example, the hearing officer reported that: 
The players must also abide by a social media policy, which restricts what 
they can post on the internet, including Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. 
In fact, the players are prohibited from denying a coach’s “friend” request 
and the former’s postings are monitored. The Employer prohibits players 
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The players filed the petition to unionize under Northwestern 
University, a private institution located in Evanston, Illinois.181 At 
that time, the team was composed of roughly 112 players, with 
eighty-five of these athletes receiving scholarships worth about 
$61,000 a year.182 Northwestern is a member institution of the NCAA 
and is the only private institution in the Big Ten Conference.183
Northwestern is also one of seventeen, out of 125, teams in the FBS 
that is a private college or university.184 Ultimately, a hearing officer 
for the NLRB declared that the petitioning players from
Northwestern were employees under § 2 of the NLRA on account of 
the exchange of scholarships for the athletes’ academic exploits.185
On appeal, the Board did not consider whether the football 
players were statutory employees under § 2 of the NLRA.186 Rather, 
it concluded that, even if the players were statutory employees, 
exercising jurisdiction would not effectuate the policies of the 
NLRA.187 In support, the Board cited the structure of college 
football, pointing out that it could not exercise jurisdiction over the 
vast majority of member institutions, therefore making its potential 
decision a source of labor instability.188 The Board further reasoned 
that there was no comparable precedent for the case, as scholarship 
players did not resemble graduate students or any other group of 
individuals that have been deemed to be statutory employees.189
Particularly, the Board identified the fact that, unlike graduate 
from giving media interviews unless they are directed to participate in 
interviews that are arranged by the Athletic Department. Players are 
prohibited from swearing in public, and if a player “embarrasses” the 
team, he can be suspended for one game.
Id. at 9-10.
181. See Nocera & Strauss, supra note 27, at 8. 
182. Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 3. 
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 8. 
186. See id. at 3 (determining that “even if the scholarship players were 
statutory employees (which, again, is an issue we do not decide), it would not 
effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction”) (emphasis added). 
187. See id.
188. See id. (holding that “because of . . . the composition and structure of 
FBS football (in which the overwhelming majority of competitors are public 
colleges and universities over which the Board cannot assert jurisdiction), it would 
not promote stability in labor relations to assert jurisdiction in this case”). 
189. Id. at 3-4 (“[T]he scholarship players do not fit into any analytical 
framework that the Board has used in cases involving other types of students or 
athletes.”). 
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students, the players were being compensated for an extracurricular 
activity.190 Nevertheless, it also conceded the fact that it had 
exercised jurisdiction over collegiate athletic matters previously,191
including those involving coaches,192 employees who worked athletic 
events,193 and referees.194
The Board further conceded that the FBS system does resemble 
professional sports to a degree.195 However, it dismissed the 
importance of this concession by illuminating one key difference—
the existence of a symbiotic relationship between the schools, their 
conferences, and the NCAA, meaning that a labor decision for one 
team impacts the entire structure.196 Accordingly, the Board 
determined that exercising jurisdiction would disrupt labor relations 
systematically because there is no opportunity to unionize on a 
league-wide basis as there is in professional athletics.197 Particularly, 
the Board emphasized that only seventeen private, out of 125 total, 
institutions fall under the scope of the NLRA, with Northwestern 
being the only private institution in the Big Ten Conference.198
Nevertheless, the Board did provide a ray of hope for future 
efforts to unionize.199 Specifically, the Board mentioned that it may 
assume a different approach if all players, or at least all private 
institution players, attempted to unionize.200 This optimism only 
increased as the Obama-administration-appointed Board issued case 
190. See id. 
191. See id. at 6. 
192. See Univ. of Bridgeport, 229 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1075 (1977) (focusing on 
a larger bargaining unit that included coaches); Manhattan Coll., 195 N.L.R.B. 65, 
66 (1972) (determining that athletic coaches that were not academic teachers should 
be included in a bargaining unit). 
193. See Providence Coll., 340 N.L.R.B. 966, 971-72 (2003).
194. See Big E. Conference, 282 N.L.R.B. 335, 340-42 (1986) (holding that 
basketball referees were directly employed by the conference). 
195. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 4. For example, both systems 
generate substantial revenue, and both depend upon direct interaction between 
member teams. See id. 
196. See id. at 4-5 (deeming the FBS to be a “markedly different type of 
enterprise”). 
197. See id. at 5. 
198. Id. With most teams coming from state institutions, any effort to 
unionize and collectively bargain would require state permission, which has been 
uniformly denied. See id. 
199. See id. at 6. 
200. See id. (proclaiming “[w]e note that our decision to decline jurisdiction 
in this case is based on the facts in the record before us, and that subsequent changes 
in the treatment of scholarship players could outweigh the considerations that 
motivate our decision today”).
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law and internal analyses that provided transformative pieces of 
persuasion for future unionization efforts.201 However, much of this 
hope for collective bargaining has now been quashed by a recent 
Board decision.202
D. The Board’s Decision in Trustees of Columbia
One ray of hope for collective bargaining in college football 
emerged in August 2016, when a Democrat-majority Board203
reconsidered the issue of whether graduate students who perform 
services for universities are employees under § 2 of the NLRA.204
Ultimately, the Board reversed field again, as it overturned Brown 
University and reverted back to the common-law employment test 
for determining whether students can be employees under the 
NLRA.205 In its decision, the Board highlighted the NLRA’s purpose 
of encouraging collective bargaining and protecting workers’ rights 
to organize, associate, and choose representation.206 The Board 
further remarked on the NLRA’s broad definition of employee, 
which solidified its finding that where students are compensated for 
the work they perform for a university, statutory employment may be 
found.207
In deciphering its past interpretations of the NLRA, the Board 
openly criticized its earlier holding that student assistants could not 
also be statutory employees.208 Consequently, the Board returned to 
its original standard that a common-law employment relationship 
necessarily creates a sufficient basis for a finding of statutory 
employment.209 In support, the Board pointed to the Supreme Court’s 
201. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 
slip op. at 1 (Aug. 23, 2016); Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 16-23. 
202. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip op. 
at 2 (Dec. 14, 2017).
203. See Members of the NLRB, supra note 9.
204. See Trs. of Columbia, slip op. at 1. 
205. See id. at 2 (holding that “given [the policy of the act], coupled with the 
very broad statutory definitions of both ‘employee’ and ‘employer,’ it is appropriate 
to extend statutory coverage to students working for universities covered by the 
Act”).
206. See id. (referencing the purpose established by 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2016)).
207. See id. at 2.
208. See id. at 5. The Board specifically criticized its own decision from 
Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004). See id.
209. See id. at 5. The Board did not, however, state that where a common-
law employment relationship exists the employee must be accorded collective 
bargaining rights under the NLRA. See id. 
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approval of a broad definition of employee utilized by the Board in 
the past.210 It also emphasized the expansive scope of the NLRA,211
indicating that the Act covers all those who work for a private entity 
with the expectation of tangible compensation.212 It further 
acknowledged its past failure of not focusing on economic 
components of relationships.213
Even with its refurbished legal interpretation, the Board had to 
establish why asserting jurisdiction over graduate assistants was 
necessary.214 The Board first rationalized its decision to exercise 
jurisdiction by criticizing the logic in Brown University that 
collective bargaining could not peacefully exist in an academic 
environment, noting that there was zero empirical evidence 
supporting that finding.215 The Board then emphasized that student 
assistants can be both students and workers at the same time, with 
the NLRA governing their employment functions.216 Further, the 
Board justified its decision by acknowledging that while the 
recognition of graduate assistants as employees could be considered 
novel, collective bargaining is historically flexible and adaptable.217
Finally, the Board criticized Brown University for not considering 
the potential benefits of graduate assistants’ unionization,218 as well 
210. See id. at 5 (citing the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the Board’s 
concept that the existence of a common law agency relationship in a labor context 
indicates statutory employment in NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 
85, 94 (1995)). 
211. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
212. See Trs. of Columbia, slip op. at 4 (referencing the Supreme Court’s 
imperative that the Act provides “a definition that ‘includes any person who works 
for another in return for financial or other compensation’”) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. at 90).  
213. See id. at 6 (instructing that “the payment of compensation, in 
conjunction with the employer’s control, suffices to establish an employment 
relationship for purposes of the Act”).
214. See id. 
215. See id. at 7 (criticizing Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004), 
because its rationale was “almost entirely theoretical,” and citing labor law scholars’
disagreement with Brown due to its total lack of empirical support).
216. See id. at 7 (noting that “a graduate student may be both a 
student and an employee; a university may be both the student’s 
educator and employer”).
217. See id. at 9 (justifying its skepticism by signaling collective 
bargaining’s historical flexibility and the utilization of collective bargaining by 
faculty in the academic setting for decades prior).
218. See id. at 11-12 (referencing Columbia “neglect[ing] to weigh the 
possibility of any benefits that flow from collective bargaining, such as those 
envisioned by Congress when it adopted the Act”). 
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as for its failure to recognize the present system’s unresponsiveness 
to students’ needs that created labor unrest.219
The Board’s acknowledgement of jurisdiction and 
reestablishment of the common-law definition of employment 
required them to apply the common-law employment test, which 
“generally requires that the employer have the right to control the 
employee’s work, and that the work be performed in exchange for 
compensation.”220 The Board first established the existence of control 
exercised by Columbia over the graduate students through several 
indicative facts: demands that certain graduate assistants teach,221
controls on how research was conducted,222 and the University 
controlled the work product223 for roughly twenty hours per week.224
Further, the Board dismissed Columbia’s arguments that the control 
was temporary and contingent on acceptance into the University on 
the basis of academics, asserting that these factors are not mutually 
exclusive of an economic relationship.225 Next, the Board had little 
issue concluding that tangible compensation was present, pointing to 
the tuition and stipend earned by the graduate assistants.226 In doing 
so, the Board began to change the narrative with regard to student 
unionization, which gave hope of future recognition of athletes as 
statutory employees.227
E. The Former General Counsel’s Internal Memorandum
The next inspiring analyses came in January 2017, when the 
Board’s (now former) Democrat General Counsel opined in an 
Internal Memorandum to NLRB regional directors that football 
players of FBS private universities are statutory employees under the 
219. See id. at 12 (finding the old system to be “insufficiently responsive to 
student assistants’ needs”). 
220. Id. at 15. 
221. See id.
222. See id. at 14.
223. See id. at 19.
224. See id. at 14.
225. Id. at 20 (“[T]he Board has made clear that finite tenure alone cannot be 
a basis on which to deny bargaining rights.”). 
226. See id. at 7 (holding that “the extent of any required ‘economic’ 
dimension to an employment relationship is the payment of tangible 
compensation”); see id. at 17 (referencing that the stipends were contingent on the 
teaching assistantships). 
227. See infra Part IV. 
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NLRA.228 The General Counsel pointed to the facts of Northwestern 
University, the degree of control the NCAA possesses over the 
players’ activities,229 and the Board’s decision in Trustees of 
Columbia as foundational pieces of evidence for his conclusion.230
Particularly, he reasoned that there was nothing within Northwestern 
University that foreclosed a future finding of statutory employment 
under the NLRA for private university FBS football players.231
Further, in the Internal Memorandum, the former General 
Counsel detailed exactly why football players are employees under 
the NLRA.232 To begin, he provided the definition of employee under 
§ 2 of the NLRA,233 noting that student–athletes are not among the 
Act’s enumerated exceptions to coverage.234 His next step was 
establishing that the athletes in Northwestern University did perform 
a service for the University.235 Further, he identified that the 
228. See Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 16. 
229. See id. at 19. The Memorandum stated:
The NCAA has the right to control and actually controls the competition 
among football players and many of their terms and conditions of 
employment, including the maximum number of practice and competition 
hours, scholarship eligibility, limitations on compensation, minimum 
grade point average and other conditions for potential loss of scholarships, 
restrictions on gifts and benefits players may accept, restrictions on the 
number of scholarship players, and mandatory drug testing. The NCAA 
also maintains a “Compliance Assistance Program” to ensure that colleges 
and student-athletes are in compliance with NCAA rules, including those 
that regulate terms and conditions of employment, and colleges employ 
staff whose sole function is to ensure compliance with those rules.
Id. 
230. See id. at 16.
231. See id. at 17.
232. See id. at 18 (asserting that “[t]he conclusion that Division I FBS 
scholarship football players in private colleges and universities are employees under 
the NLRA is supported by the statutory language and policies of the NLRA”).
233. See id. (providing the common-law definition that “an employee 
includes any person ‘who perform[s] services for another and [is] subject to the 
other’s control or right of control. Consideration, i.e., payment, is strongly indicative 
of employee status’”) (quoting Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 
(1999)). 
234. See id. (referencing that “Section 2(3) contains only a few enumerated 
exceptions, and university employees, football players, and students are not among 
them”). 
235. See id. at 19 (pronouncing that the football program “undoubtedly 
boosted student applications and alumni financial donations”). Particularly, the 
General Counsel referenced the fact that the football program brought in $76 million 
in net profit over a ten-year period and further brought positive attention to the 
University. Id. 
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scholarships the athletes received for their services constituted 
significant compensation.236 He also intricately explained how 
Northwestern controlled the players’ athletic contributions and daily 
lives.237 Finally, after recognizing the existence of an employment 
relationship,238 he subtly questioned the continued use of amateurism 
in light of the substantial financial value of modern FBS football 
programs.239
While undeniably significant, this acknowledgement of football 
players as employees was limited for a number of reasons.240 First, 
the memorandum did not bind the Board to recognizing players as 
statutory employees in the future.241 Second, given that a Republican 
majority now controls the Board and Republican boards have 
repeatedly denied graduate students the opportunity to collectively 
bargain, history suggests the current board will not follow this 
opinion.242 Finally, the position held by the former General Counsel 
was expressly limited to those players enrolled in private colleges 
and universities, once again reflecting the important dichotomy 
236. See id. In fact, he did not even deliberate over the issue, conclusively 
asserting that “[t]he players’ compensation is clearly tied to their status and 
performance as football players, since they risk the loss of their scholarships if they 
quit the team or are removed because they violate their school’s or the NCAA’s 
rules.” Id. 
237. See id. at 19-20 (commenting on the daily itineraries the players must 
follow, the minimum GPA requirement, the restrictions on gifts, and the random 
drug tests, among other things). 
238. See id. at 20 (concluding “FBS scholarship football players clearly 
satisfy the broad Section 2(3) definition of employee and the common-law test”). 
239. See id. at 22 (contrasting the tradition of amateurism with “the 
enormous revenue generated by FBS football programs and the substantial salaries 
paid to university administrators, coaches, and conference officials involved in the 
sport”). 
240. See Munson, supra note 13.
241. See id. (stating the Internal Memorandum “is nothing more than the 
opinion of the current general counsel of the NLRB”). In fact, after the 
memorandum was released, the NCAA’s chief legal officer emphasized this fact, 
announcing that “we have stated before and he was obligated to acknowledge, the 
Board previously decided that it would not exercise jurisdiction regarding the 
employment context of student-athletes and their schools. The general counsel’s 
memo does not change that decision and does not allow student-athletes to 
unionize.” Jon Solomon, NLRB Counsel: Football Players at Private FBS Schools 
Are Employees, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.cbssports.com/college-
football/news/nlrb-counsel-football-players-at-private-fbs-schools-are-employees/ 
[https://perma.cc/H66Q-U6JA]. 
242. See Munson, supra note 13 (“[N]ew general counsel, appointed by 
President Donald Trump, could rewrite and reverse this opinion.”); Members of the 
NLRB, supra note 9; supra Section II.B.
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between private and public employees.243 Nevertheless, the former 
General Counsel’s conscientious decision to cement such an 
acknowledgement in writing, at the time, provided probative hope 
for future unionization efforts.244
F. The Seventh Circuit’s Answer to the Question of Student–Athletes 
as Employees 
Student–athletes were confronted with an obstacle in their 
pursuit of employment recognition in January 2017.245 The Seventh 
Circuit dealt this blow by denying claims of Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) violations posed by members of the University of 
Pennsylvania Women’s Track and Field Team against the NCAA 
and 120 member institutions.246 In making this decision, the court 
declined to find standing against the NCAA, reasoning that the 
relationship between the NCAA and the student–athletes was too far 
attenuated.247 Particularly, the court stated that the athletes could not 
allege an injury that was connected to the NCAA either in 
traceability or redressability.248
The Seventh Circuit further denied the claim against the 
University of Pennsylvania, definitively holding that student–athletes 
are not employees under the FLSA.249 In its reasoning, the court 
pointed to the longstanding relationship of amateurism between 
universities and their athletes,250 the lack of historical expectations of 
compensation,251 and an interpretive guide from the Department of 
Labor that advised that extracurricular activities, such as athletics, do 
243. See Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 20 (recognizing “the 
composition of Division I FBS football, in which the majority of the teams are 
public universities not subject to the Board’s jurisdiction”). 
244. See Munson, supra note 13 (describing how this may open the door for 
athletes to receive a share in the profits). 
245. See Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 2016).
246. See id. 
247. See id. at 289 (stating that the athletes’ “connection to the other schools 
and the NCAA is far too tenuous to be considered an employment relationship”).
248. See id. 
249. See id. at 293 (asserting “we do not believe that the Department of 
Labor intended the FLSA to apply to student athletes”). 
250. See id. at 291 (referencing a “tradition of amateurism”). 
251. See id. at 293 (concluding that “[a]lthough we do not doubt that student 
athletes spend a tremendous amount of time playing for their respective schools, 
they do so—and have done so for over a hundred years under the NCAA—without 
any real expectation of earning an income”).
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not constitute work.252 Together, these factors inspired the court to 
reason that the student–athletes are not employees under the 
FLSA.253
However, in his concurrence, Judge Hamilton recognized the 
differences between the claims asserted in the case before the court 
and potential future claims by student–athletes.254 First, he 
highlighted the fact that, in accordance with Ivy League standards, 
the filing athletes received no scholarship or compensation.255
Further, he noted that the filing athletes were not participants of 
revenue sports such as FBS football or men’s basketball.256
Particularly, he emphasized the billions of dollars in revenue that 
member institutions generate, which reveals a unique economic 
reality of the sports.257 Therefore, Judge Hamilton carefully separated 
himself out of fear for the majority’s cut and dry rule that student–
athletes are not statutory employees.258
In whole, student unionization efforts are characterized by 
routine modification, revision, and total alteration.259 For the time 
being, however, the current standard of employment under the 
NLRA revolves around a common-law definition of employment and 
the existence of control by the alleged employer.260 With this 
refurbished approach, the Board identified in Trustees of Columbia
that graduate students who are under the control of a private 
university and are compensated by the university are statutory 
252. See id. at 292-93 (citing that “[t]he Department of Labor, through its 
Field Operations Handbook (‘FOH’), has also indicated that student athletes are not 
employees under the FLSA”).
253. See id. at 293 (holding “as a matter of law, that student athletes are not 
employees and are not entitled to a minimum wage under the FLSA”).
254. See id. at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring) (“I am less confident, however, 
that our reasoning should extend to students who receive athletic scholarships to 
participate in so-called revenue sports like Division I men’s basketball and FBS 
football.”).
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See id. (emphasizing that football and men’s basketball “involve 
billions of dollars of revenue for colleges and universities”).
258. See id. 
259. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 92-95; see also supra 
Section II.B. 
260. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 
slip op. at 5 (Aug. 23, 2016) (stating that “[w]here student assistants have an 
employment relationship with their university under the common law test . . . this 
relationship is sufficient to establish that the student assistant is a Section 2(3) 
employee for all statutory purposes”). 
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employees under the NLRA.261 However, given the recent political 
alterations and the Republican Party’s historical view of graduate 
student unionization, this approach is in significant danger.262
Further, even with the current liberalized standard of student 
unionization, the fact that most alleged employers of FBS football 
players are public institutions would thwart any unionization 
attempts.263 Therefore, if FBS football players want to unionize, they
would have to do so under a private entity such as the NCAA.264
III. A BRIEF INSIGHT INTO JOINT EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE NLRA
In specified instances, an employee can allege that an entity is a 
joint employer under the NLRA.265 Joint employment acknowledges 
that more than one business entity can be an employer of a single 
employee.266 Such a relationship exists where two business entities, 
although separate in nature, cooperate together in the governance of 
the essential terms and conditions of employment.267 Similar to the 
Board’s indecisive approach toward graduate assistants,268 its 
approach to joint employment under the NLRA is muddled and 
characterized by inconsistencies,269 following the political trajectory 
of the Board.270
261. See id. at 7.
262. See Alana Semuels, Will Grad Students Lose the Right to Unionize 
Under Trump?, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2017/06/graduate-students-unions/531975/ [https://perma.cc/ECC7-3CWE] 
(predicting “[a] reversal may be coming”). 
263. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 3 (Aug. 17, 
2015).
264. See infra Part IV (describing a joint-employment attempt against the 
NCAA under Browning-Ferris II). 
265. See, e.g., NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 
1124 (3d Cir. 1982).
266. See Rueben A. Garcia, Note, Modern Accountability for a Modern 
Workplace: Reevaluating the National Labor Relations Board’s Joint Employer 
Standard, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 741, 750 (2016) (detailing that employment exists 
where an entity possesses control, or potential for control, of significant terms of 
employment).
267. See Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1527, 1540 (1996).
268. See supra Section II.B (describing the Board’s inconsistencies in 
deciding graduate student unionization efforts). 
269. See Garcia, supra note 266, at 750. 
270. See Wiessner, supra note 9; Members of the NLRB, supra note 9.
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A. A History of Inconsistency
Although joint employment is well engrained in the history of 
the NLRA,271 one particular inconsistency that has plagued the Board 
is the requisite degree of control that each entity must hold to be 
considered a joint employer.272 Initially, the Board construed the 
doctrine broadly, recognizing both direct and indirect control as 
sufficient for a finding of joint employment.273 This approach lasted 
into the 1980s, as the Board and courts continued to accept the 
existence of joint employment where two business entities shared 
decision-making powers regarding the essential terms and conditions 
of labor.274
However, the state of the doctrine was scrambled in 1984, 
when the Board strayed from its past precedent through two 
decisions that declared joint employment did not apply where 
supervision was insignificant and routine.275 Instead, the Board 
would require that an entity’s control be exercised in a direct and 
271. See Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 53 N.L.R.B. 1428, 1431 (1943) 
(stating “[w]e find that Bethlehem is also the employer within Section 2(2) of the 
Act of the employees involved herein”) (emphasis added). Therefore, even as early 
as 1943, the Board recognized the concept that there could be multiple employers of 
a single group of employees. See id. The doctrine was further solidified within 
Supreme Court jurisprudence in 1964 in Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 
481 (1964), which was remanded for further factual consideration to determine 
whether Greyhound possessed the requisite degree of control over an independent 
contractor to be considered a joint employer.
272. See Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 27, 
2015), overruled by Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip 
op. at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017) (explaining how recent case law related to joint employment 
was “inconsistent with prior caselaw that has not been expressly overruled”). 
273. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 267, at 1541; Garcia, supra note 266, at 
750. 
274. See NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1124 
(3d Cir. 1982). There, the Third Circuit clearly iterated the approach in considering 
joint employment up until that time: “[W]here two or more employers exert 
significant control over the same employees—where from the evidence it can be 
shown that they share or co-determine those matters governing essential terms and 
conditions of employment—they constitute joint employers within the meaning of 
the NLRA.” Id. 
275. See Laerco Transp. & Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 326 (1984) 
(denying joint employment based on “the minimal and routine nature of Laerco 
supervision”); TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 799 (1984) (finding that “[a]lthough 
Crown may have exercised some control over the drivers, Crown did not affect the 
terms and conditions of employment to such a degree that it may be deemed a joint 
employer”) (emphasis added). 
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immediate manner. 276 By the time of Browning-Ferris II, the 
Democrat-majority Board believed that the standard had become too 
narrow, no longer effectuated the policies of the NLRA, and that a 
change should be considered.277
B. Browning Ferris II: Reviving Indirect Control 
After it recognized the severely narrowed state of the joint-
employment doctrine, a Democrat-controlled Board concluded that 
the limitations had gone too far, impermissibly undermining the 
NLRA’s intended protections.278 In turn, the Board decided to revert 
back to what it deemed to be the original standard of joint 
employment,279 which the Third Circuit enunciated in the initial 
Browning-Ferris.280 This meant that joint employment would arise in 
instances where two or more business entities share decision-making 
powers in the governance of the essential terms and conditions of 
employment.281
The Board deconstructed the revived joint-employment 
doctrine into a two-step process.282 First, it articulated that the initial 
inquiry is whether both entities possess a common-law employment 
276. See Airborne Freight Co., 338 N.L.R.B. 597, 597 n.1 (2002) (stating 
that “approximately 20 years ago, the Board, with court approval, abandoned its 
previous test in this area, which had focused on a putative joint 
employer’s indirect control over matters relating to the employment relationship”); 
see also Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 10 (describing how the Board “imposed 
additional requirements that effectively narrowed the joint-employer standard”); 
Garcia, supra note 266, at 750.
277. See Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 2 (explaining its disapproval of the 
additional requirements it had imposed since 1984, “which serve to significantly and 
unjustifiably narrow the circumstances where a joint-employment relationship can 
be found” and “potentially undermine[] the core protections of the Act”); Garcia, 
supra note 266, at 751 (reporting that the Board invited parties to file briefs on the 
issue).
278. See Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 1 (identifying that “the Board, 
without explanation, has since imposed additional requirements for finding joint-
employer status, which have no clear basis in . . . the text or policies of the Act”). 
279. See id. at 2 (holding that “we restate the Board’s joint-employer 
standard to reaffirm the standard articulated by the Third Circuit in [the first] 
Browning-Ferris decision”). 
280. See NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1124 
(3d Cir. 1982); supra note 274 (describing the joint-employment standard adopted 
by the Third Circuit in that case).
281. See Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 2. 
282. See id.
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relationship with the specified employees.283 According to the Board,
an individual is deemed to be a common-law employee when he or 
she performs services for another, is compensated for those services, 
and is under the control of the other.284 When considering an 
employment relationship, the Board provided that it would consider 
the existence, extent, and objective of control over an employee’s 
work.285 Thus, the Board declared that mere service by the employee 
is not sufficient for a finding of control.286 Most importantly, it 
abolished the requirement that such control be direct and 
immediate.287 Instead, a putative employer’s control could once again 
be indirect, thereby making the determinative factor whether the 
employer possesses, not exercises, the right to control.288
The Board then stated that if a common-law employment 
relationship exists, the next question is “whether the putative joint 
employer possesses sufficient control over employees’ essential 
terms and conditions of employment to permit meaningful collective 
bargaining.”289 Here too, consideration into the existence, extent, and 
object of control possessed by the proposed joint employer is 
required.290 The Board further identified several different influential 
matters to the essential terms and conditions of employment,291
including hiring and firing, discipline and supervision, wages, hours, 
number of workers, scheduling control, and the manner and method 
of work performance.292 Finally, the Board clarified that even where 
sufficient control is established, the finding of joint employment 
283. See id. (stating that “the initial inquiry is whether there is a common-
law employment relationship with the employees in question”). 
284. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 n.3 (2004).
285. See Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 12 (stating that “the Board properly 
considers the existence, extent, and object of the putative joint employer’s control”).
286. See id. (labeling mere service as “not evidence of an employment, or 
joint-employment, relationship”).
287. See id. at 14 (proclaiming that “[j]ust as the common law does not 
require that control must be exercised in order to establish an employment 
relationship, neither does it require that control . . . must be exercised directly and 
immediately”).
288. See id. at 2 (holding that “control exercised indirectly—such as through 
an intermediary—may establish joint-employer status”).
289. Id. (emphasis added).
290. See id. (describing those factors as “central” to the inquiry).
291. See id. at 29 (clarifying that, while these matters were suggestive, the 
list was “nonexhaustive”). 
292. See id. at 15 (noting that the Board was subscribing to the approach 
followed by the federal courts of appeals). 
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must further the NLRA’s purpose293 of promoting peaceful resolution 
of labor-related disputes through collective bargaining.294
In justifying its decision to revert back to the original joint-
employment standard, the Board cited changing complexities within 
the modern labor force as a determinative factor.295 The Board 
recognized that its duty is to apply the intricacies of the NLRA to 
modern industrial life,296 and it asserted that the joint-employment 
standard in use was failing to achieve this purpose.297 This failure, 
the Board declared, resulted in the deprivation of employees’ 
statutory right to collectively bargain with their employers over the 
essential terms and conditions of their employment.298 Therefore, the 
joint-employment standard ran contrary to the mandates of the 
NLRA and required reformation.299
However, the Board’s decision was not free from criticism, 
particularly from its own dissent.300 The dissent pointed to five major 
problems with the Board’s overhaul of the joint-employment 
standard.301 First, it labeled the standard as implausibly broad, not 
only subjecting an incredible number of business entities to joint-
293. See id. at 12 (accepting its responsibility to “tak[e] into account the 
Act’s paramount policy to ‘encourage[] the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining’”) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)). 
294. See id. at 12-13; see also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 
U.S. 203, 211 (1964) (holding that “[o]ne of the primary purposes of the Act is to 
promote the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-
management controversies to the mediatory influence of negotiation”).
295. See Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 11 (finding that “the diversity of 
workplace arrangements in today’s economy has significantly expanded,” and that 
“[t]his development is reason enough to revisit the Board’s current joint-employer 
standard”).
296. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979) (labeling 
the primary responsibility of the Board to be “that of ‘applying the general 
provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life’”) (quoting NLRB v. Erie 
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963)). 
297. See Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 11. The Board asserted that the 
modern workforce is distinct from the workforce under which the Board decided in 
TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984). See id. at 11. The Board further pointed to the 
fact that 4.1% of all employees today are “contingent workers.” Id. 
298. See id. at 15 (reasoning that a narrowed joint-employment standard 
increases the risk that the Board is failing to pursue the Supreme Court’s mandate to 
adopt the NLRA to modern industrial complexities).  
299. See id. at 11 (concluding “we are persuaded that the current joint-
employer standard is not mandated by the Act and that it does not best serve the 
Act’s policies.”). 
300. See id. at 25 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting). 
301. See id. at 21.
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employment liability, but also having the effect of exceeding its own 
statutory authority.302 Second, the dissent criticized the majority’s 
citation of labor force changes as simply incorrect, arguing the 
current workforce resembles the workforce that has been in place for 
the past 200 years.303 Third, the dissent asserted that an alteration of 
the standard must come from Congress and not the Board.304 Fourth, 
it claimed the majority’s adopted standard is littered with 
ambiguities, such that it provides little to no guidance to those 
entities that it will certainly affect.305 Finally, the dissent criticized 
the use of collective bargaining to remedy the current inequality of 
bargaining power, reasoning that it will only promote labor 
disruptions and not remedy them.306
Further, interest groups, including the United States Chamber 
of Commerce, have also argued307 that the Board’s decision ignores 
precedent and bypasses congressional intent.308 Worries have also 
been expressed about the implications of the new standard on the 
franchisor–franchisee relationship, a foundational piece of the United 
States economy.309 Even so, the Equal Opportunity Employment 
Commission (EEOC) has claimed to use an almost identical joint-
302. See id. (stating that “no bargaining table is big enough to seat all of the 
entities that will be potential joint employers under the majority’s new standards”). 
303. See id. at 22 (arguing that the economy pictured by the majority “has 
not existed in this country for more than 200 years”).
304. Id. (“This type of change is clearly within the province of Congress, not 
the Board.”).
305. Id. (“[T]he majority abandons a longstanding test that provided 
certainty and predictability, and replaces it with an ambiguous standard.”).
306. Id. at 23 (“[T]he ‘inequality’ addressed by the majority is the wrong 
target, and collective bargaining is the wrong remedy.”).
307. See Robert Iafolla & Daniel Wiessner, Browning-Ferris Fights U.S. 
Ruling on ‘Joint-Employment’ in Court, REUTERS (June 7, 2016, 6:22 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-browningferris-nlrb-idUSKCN0YT2PQ 
[https://perma.cc/PQ3P-MMDR] (reporting the director of labor policy at the 
Chamber of Commerce’s warning that the decision will eliminate jobs). 
308. See id. (arguing “[s]ome [business] groups have warned that it could 
upend the franchise model”). 
309. See, e.g., Robert C. Brady et al., Can a Franchisor Be Deemed the 
Employer of a Franchisee’s Employee?: The Unsettled Landscape of Joint Employer 
Status, 298. N.J. LAW. 57, 59 (2016) (asserting that the decision has placed 
franchisors “in an untenable situation: Implement controls to protect its mark and be 
potentially subject to joint-employer status or fail to maintain sufficient controls to 
protect against joint employer status and risk abandonment of the [trade]mark”).
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employment standard, and courts have routinely upheld the EEOC’s 
standard.310
The Democrat-based Board’s decision in Browning-Ferris II311
emphasized the importance of employees’ right to collectively 
bargain.312 By expanding the definition of joint employment, the 
Board attempted to establish a standard that would have a lasting 
impact in American industry.313 However, this reemphasis on a more 
expansive state of collective bargaining was short lived, as a 
Republican-appointed-majority Board immediately reverted back to 
the old standard of requiring direct control.314
C. Political Cycle: Immediate Reversal in Hy-Brand Industries
After regaining control of the Board after the election of 
President Trump, one of the Republican Board’s principal goals was 
to overturn the joint-employment standard adopted in Browning-
Ferris II.315 The Board seized the opportunity to do so in December 
2017, overturning Browning-Ferris II because it was a “distortion of 
common law” and “ill-advised as a matter of policy.”316 In doing so, 
the Board limited the scope of joint employment by requiring 
putative employers to actually exercise direct and immediate 
control.317
The Board started its opinion by echoing the five concerns 
raised by the dissent in Browning-Ferris II.318 However, its principal 
310. See Matthew Bultman, EEOC Backs NLRB’s Joint-Employer Rule at 
D.C. Circ., LAW360 (Sept. 14, 2016, 9:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
840135/eeoc-backs-nlrb-s-joint-employer-rule-at-dc-circ [https://perma.cc/PSR4-
V23S] (detailing the EEOC’s support for the standard because it is workable and 
flexible). 
311. See Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 1.
312. See id. at 2 (previewing its decision by emphasizing its goal of 
establishing a standard that can encourage collective bargaining). 
313. See Brady, supra note 309, at 58; Garcia, supra note 266, at 753. 
314. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip op. 
at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017).
315. See Sean Higgins, Senate OKs Trump Pick for NLRB, WASH. EXAMINER 
(Sept. 25, 2017, 6:16 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senate-oks-trump-
pick-for-nlrb/article/2635556 [https://perma.cc/JFJ5-K5GD] (labeling changing the 
joint-employment standard as a “top priority”). 
316. Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors Ltd., slip op. at 2. 
317. See id. at 34 (requiring control that has a “‘direct and immediate’ 
impact on employment terms”). 
318. See id. at 1-2; Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 21 
(Aug. 27, 2015), overruled by Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., slip op. at 1
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concern was the drastic implications an expansive joint-employment 
doctrine can have on the labor force and economy as a whole.319
Specifically, the Board expressed concerns over the fact that 
employers across the nation could be subjected to joint-employment 
liability without ever knowing they had a responsibility to respect the 
collective bargaining rights of purported and distant employees.320
For example, the Board argued that, under the Browning-Ferris II
standard, a homeowner who hired a contractor for renovations and 
set limitations on the working hours and number of employees could 
be considered a joint employer.321 This, the Board declared, 
exemplified the impermissible vagueness of the Browning-Ferris II 
standard that resulted in massive legal uncertainty across the labor 
industry.322
Thus, the Board not only found that the Browning-Ferris II 
standard was an inappropriate breakaway from precedent, but was 
also overbroad and unfit for real-world collective bargaining.323 In 
turn, the Board once again required that the relevant considerations 
for joint-employment claims be whether control was actually 
exercised, directly and immediately shaped employment terms, and 
was not limited.324 Even with this heightened standard, the Board 
found that joint employment did exist in the circumstances before 
it.325
(Member Miscimarra, dissenting); supra Section III.B (detailing the dissent’s five 
major problems with the Browning-Ferris II decision). 
319. See Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 21 (“Changing the test for 
identifying the ‘employer,’ therefore, has dramatic implications for labor relations 
policy and its effect on the economy.”).
320. Id. (“This change will subject countless entities to unprecedented new 
joint-bargaining obligations that most do not even know they have, to potential joint 
liability for unfair labor practices and breaches of collective-bargaining agreements, 
and to economic protest activity, including what have heretofore been unlawful 
secondary strikes, boycotts, and picketing.”). 
321. See id. at 36. 
322. See id. at 23. The Board emphasized the uncertainty and impact in the 
franchising industry, which makes up 3.4% of the nation’s GDP. Id. at 45. The 
Board argued, “The majority does not mention, much less discuss, the potential 
impact of its new standard on franchising relations, but it will almost certainly be 
momentous and hugely disruptive.” Id. 
323. Id. at 37 (“Our colleagues greatly expand the joint-employer test 
without grappling with its practical implications for real-world collective-bargaining 
relationships.”).
324. See id. at 7-8. 
325. See id. at 18. The Board highlighted the fact that there was an officer 
“who served as the Corporate Secretary for both companies, was directly involved in 
the decisions at both companies to discharge all seven of the discriminatees.” See 
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The dissent, comprised of two Democrats, criticized the 
decision on multiple fronts, both procedural and substantive.326
Procedurally, the dissent criticized the majority for adopting a new 
standard in a case where there was clearly joint employment, no 
party requested reconsideration of the Browning-Ferris II standard, 
and there was no opportunity given to interested persons of the 
public to comment on the issue, contrary to the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.327 Substantively, the dissent labeled 
the decision as directly contrary to the NLRA’s policy of 
encouraging collective bargaining and common law, opining the 
majority assured “employers that, by retaining a nominal distance 
from the supervision of workers, they can exert control and still 
avoid statutory bargaining obligations.”328 The concern of the dissent, 
and major labor organizations, was that workers’ rights to 
collectively bargain would be significantly diminished under the 
majority’s standard.329
Given the historical inconsistencies and each political party’s 
respective position toward joint employment, the decision in Hy-
Brand Industries was not surprising.330 Nevertheless, its impact is 
vast, as the narrowed standard affects countless numbers of 
employers and employees.331 Unfortunately, one such set of 
employees who may be affected by the decision is FBS football 
players, who likely can no longer argue that the NCAA is a joint 
employer.332
IV. WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN: THE ARGUMENT THAT COULD HAVE 
REMEDIED THE INEQUALITY
For years, the NCAA has labeled football players as student–
athletes333 even while, objectively, their status resembles that of 
also Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip op. at 31 (Dec. 
14, 2017).
326. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., slip op. at 35 (Members Pearce 
and McFerran, dissenting). 
327. See id. at 38.
328. See id. at 47.
329. See id. at 36; see also Wiessner, supra note 9.
330. See Higgins, supra note 315; supra Section III.A.
331. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., slip op. at 2 (criticizing the 
Browning-Ferris II standard for “subject[ing] countless entities to unprecedented 
new joint bargaining obligations that most may not even know they have”).
332. See infra Part IV.  
333. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 83.
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employees.334 As employees, the players should be entitled to 
collectively bargain,335 a right they have been wrongfully denied up 
until this point.336 While the Obama-administration Board provided 
several suggestive analyses that could have opened the door for an 
official recognition of FBS football players as statutory employees,337
its reluctance to exercise jurisdiction in Northwestern University was 
tremendously detrimental.338 Recent Board jurisprudence339 has 
effectively eliminated a persuasive argument the Obama 
administration overlooked: that the NCAA acts as a joint employer 
over FBS scholarship football athletes.340
A. Establishing Jurisdiction
Before the athletes could have asserted the NCAA was a joint 
employer under the Browning-Ferris II standard, they would have 
had to convince the Board that exercising jurisdiction over the 
players would effectuate the policies of the NLRA.341 The necessity 
of this discussion obviously stems from the Board’s decision to deny 
jurisdiction in Northwestern University.342 The Board’s rationales 
were exposed as profoundly questionable through its exercise of 
jurisdiction, even in the face of similar arguments, in Trustees of 
Columbia.343
334. See id. at 75 (arguing that “major college sports have not been truly 
amateur for many years, if ever”).  
335. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (prohibiting certain employers from 
denying employees the right to organize and collectively bargain).
336. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 17, 
2015).
337. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 
slip op. at 5 (Aug. 23, 2016); Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 1.
338. See Munson, supra note 13 (describing the impact of the political 
change on college athletes). 
339. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip op. 
at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017).
340. See infra Section IV.C. 
341. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 3 (recognizing that “even if the 
scholarship players were statutory employees . . . it would not effectuate the policies 
of the Act to assert jurisdiction”). 
342. See id. at 1.
343. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 
slip op. at 5 (Aug. 23, 2016) (acknowledging the arguments raised by Columbia, but 
ultimately “find[ing] that they do not outweigh the considerations that favor 
extending statutory coverage to student assistants”).
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The Board’s earlier rationalization that exercising jurisdiction 
would not effectuate the policies of the NLRA and would only 
inspire instability344 was flawed for a number of reasons.345 First, the 
Board’s contention of potential instability was supported by a dearth 
of evidence and rationale.346 Unsurprisingly, the Board condemned 
such hypothetical and unsubstantiated decisions in Trustees of 
Columbia.347 Similar to the claims criticized in Trustees of Columbia,
the rationale advanced by the Board in Northwestern University was 
entirely theoretical, providing no empirical or evidentiary support for 
the contention that instability would develop.348 Instead, the Board 
repeated that college football’s structure is unique due to its makeup 
of mostly public institutions that the Board could not exercise 
jurisdiction over.349 Undeniably, college football is distinguishable 
from other established labor forces, particularly those in professional 
athletics.350 However, the Board rejected the same argument of 
uniqueness of the academic environment in Trustees of Columbia.351
Second, the Board’s professed systematic instability was 
flawed because it inexplicably ignored the ostensible instability that 
already exists.352 The current structure of college football is one of 
exploitation, covered up by a farce label of amateurism.353 While the 
344. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 5 (reasoning that “labor issues 
directly involving only an individual team and its players would also affect the 
NCAA, the Big Ten, and the other member institutions”). 
345. See Edelman, supra note 150 (arguing the decision ignores the NLRA’s 
goal of “empower[ing] non-managerial employees”). 
346. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 5-6. The Board failed to explain how 
or why instability would ensue, instead choosing to continually reiterate that the 
structure of college football would not promote stability. See id.
347. Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 8 (stating “[w]e disagree . . . with the 
conclusion reached by the Brown University Board, including its view that 
‘empirical evidence’ is irrelevant to the inquiry”) (quoting Brown Univ., 342 
N.L.R.B. 483, 492-93 (2004)).
348. See id. at 5-6 (discussing its decision to pass on jurisdiction, but 
providing no empirical support).
349. See id. at 5.
350. See id. (describing the FBS as a “markedly different type of 
enterprise”). 
351. Id. at 10-13 (countering the Board’s past reasoning that collective 
bargaining was inappropriate in academics). 
352. See supra Section I.C (outlining the scholarly criticism of the NCAA’s 
system of amateurism on the basis that it harms the players). One obvious 
representation is the income gap between the coaches and the poverty-stricken 
players. See Nocera & Strauss, supra note 27; NCAA Salaries, supra note 106.
353. See Marzan & Tillet-Saks, supra note 2, at 303; McCormick & 
McCormick, supra note 2, at 156-57.
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players sacrifice their bodies354 for compensation that places 80% of 
them below the poverty line,355 the NCAA,356 member institutions,357
television networks,358 and coaches359 are all tremendously and 
unjustly enriched.360 Instead of considering this evidence that 
exposes the system as inequitable and unstable,361 the Board pointed 
to theoretical instability as a reason to avoid deciding.362 Under the 
principles established in Trustees of Columbia, where the Board 
criticized willful blindness of the current state of affairs and 
exercised jurisdiction to remedy a system that was unresponsive to 
graduate students’ needs, its earlier ignorance of the undeniable 
inequality in college athletics is appallingly inappropriate.363
Further, the Board failed to consider the potential benefits that 
would arise out of allowing FBS football players to collectively 
bargain.364 In tune with the Board’s other purported rationales in 
Northwestern University, the Board criticized this train of thought in 
354. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 77; Strauss, supra note 
82 (detailing a lawsuit in which college football players allege the concussions 
sustained as players have led to “a variety of health problems, including mood 
swings, depression and sleeplessness”).
355. See Nocera & Strauss, supra note 27.
356. See NCAA Revenue, supra note 98 (providing the annual income of the 
NCAA). 
357. See, e.g., Jessop, supra note 96 (identifying the millions of dollars that 
marquee programs earn annually).  
358. See Porto, supra note 28, at 311 (stating “[n]obody benefits more from 
the college sports juggernaut, though, than the television networks”).
359. See, e.g., NCAA Salaries, supra note 106.
360. See, e.g., Karcher, supra note 2, at 110-11 (arguing “amateurism 
principles do not give the NCAA and its members a corresponding right or 
justification to be enriched by the portion of the broadcast rights fees attributed 
to the players’ expense and effort . . . that would normally, equitably, and morally be 
paid to them”).
361. See supra Section I.C (providing the scholarly criticisms of the system’s 
inequalities). 
362. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 5-6 (Aug. 
17, 2015).
363. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 
slip op. at 11 (Aug. 23, 2016) (criticizing arguments that “focus[] on a few discrete 
problems that may arise in bargaining—without considering the likelihood that they 
would both actually occur and not be amenable to resolution by bargaining partners 
acting in good faith”). 
364. See generally Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 1-7 (never considering the 
benefits of collective bargaining). 
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Trustees of Columbia.365 As such, the Board’s incorrect disregard of 
both the inequitable state of college football and the potential 
benefits of collective bargaining366 exposes its decision to pass on 
jurisdiction as entirely unconvincing.367
Third, the potential instability cited by the Board could have 
been remedied by a finding of joint employment for FBS football 
players under the NCAA.368 Only days after denying jurisdiction, the 
Board significantly expanded its joint-employment standard in 
Browning-Ferris II, meaning the alteration was already well within 
Board members’ thoughts.369 Thus, at the time the Board decided to 
pass on jurisdiction, there was a persuasive argument right in front of 
it that the NCAA was a putative joint employer.370 This, in turn, 
would have provided a league-wide unionization base comparable to 
that of all professional sports leagues, thereby negating any attempt 
by the Board to distinguish the two.371 While this argument has now 
been undercut by Hy-Brand Industries, the flaw in the Obama-
administration Board’s opinion is nevertheless readily apparent and 
was foreseeable at that time.372
Further, in defense of its denial of jurisdiction, the Board cited 
that it had never exercised jurisdiction over student–athletes before 
and that such athletes are distinct from cases of graduate students.373
365. Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 11-12 (stating “Columbia and amici 
neglect to weigh the possibility of any benefits that flow from collective bargaining, 
such as those envisioned by Congress when it adopted the Act”). 
366. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 80-81 (citing benefits 
that would result from a recognition of statutory employment under the NLRA, such 
as the right to wages, negotiation, collectively bargain, and striking). 
367. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 13 (condemning analyses that are 
empirically unsupported and neglectful of potential benefits).  
368. See infra Section IV.C (describing the application of the Browning-
Ferris II joint-employment standard to the NCAA). 
369. Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 2 (Aug. 27, 
2015), overruled by Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip 
op. at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017). 
370. See infra Section IV.C (describing how the NCAA could have been a
putative employer under the former joint-employment standard due to the degree of 
control it possesses over the athletes’ work habits and daily lives). 
371. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 5 (Aug. 17, 
2015) (labeling the NCAA’s system of amateurism as “unprecedented,” and 
separating it on the count that “all previous Board cases concerning professional 
sports involve leaguewide bargaining units”). 
372. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., slip op. at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017).
373. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 4 (opining that “scholarship players 
do not fit into any analytical framework that the Board has used in cases involving 
other types of students or athletes”). 
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Once again, this reasoning is unpersuasive, particularly in light of its 
decision to exercise jurisdiction in Trustees of Columbia.374 First, 
distinguishing the employment status of football players and 
graduate students on the basis of different levels of studies and work 
product makes little sense.375 After all, both groups are students 
enrolled at the university who are compensated for the work they 
provide to the university.376 Pointing to minute discrepancies 
between the two further ignores the fact that the NLRA is 
intentionally broad so as to encourage collective bargaining 
throughout all commercial activity.377
Next, even conceding the fact that jurisdiction has not been 
exercised over such individuals in the past, jurisdiction is still 
appropriate due to the nature of collective bargaining.378 It is utterly 
foolish to justify denying jurisdiction on the basis that it has not been 
exercised before, considering the fact that the issue had never been 
raised prior.379 Further, collective bargaining, as identified by 
Trustees of Columbia, has been a historically flexible system that can 
adapt to a variety of structures.380 For example, the Board 
acknowledged that “collective bargaining by student assistants at 
private universities is historically uncommon,”381 yet still exercised 
jurisdiction and recognized these individuals as statutory 
employees.382
374. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 
23, 2016). 
375. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 4 n.10. 
376. See id. at 2-3 (recognizing that the players receive a scholarship worth 
$61,000 for their substantial devotion to the football program); Trs. of Columbia,
364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, slip op. at 15.
377. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 2 (declaring that “coupled with 
the very broad statutory definitions of both ‘employee’ and ‘employer,’ it is 
appropriate to extend statutory coverage to students working for universities covered 
by the Act unless there are strong reasons not to do so”).
378. See id. at 8 (stating “[t]he National Labor Relations Act, as we have 
repeatedly emphasized, governs only the employee-employer relationship”). 
379. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 4 (acknowledging “[t]he Board has 
never before been asked to assert jurisdiction in a case involving college football 
players”).
380. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 10 (recognizing “the historic 
flexibility of collective bargaining as a practice and its viability at public universities 
where graduate student assistants are represented by labor unions and among faculty 
members at private universities”). 
381. Id.
382. See id. at 7 (deciding “the Act’s text supports the conclusion that 
student assistants who are common-law employees are covered by the Act”). 
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Opponents of college football unionization would certainly 
point to Board’s entitlement of judicial deference, claiming the 
decision should be respected.383 However, judicial review of a Board 
decision was not the appropriate remedy to the current state of 
inequality.384 Rather, the Board should have accounted for its 
expanding coverage in analogous cases and utilized a transformative 
approach to the unionization issue.385
In short, the Board’s denial of jurisdiction in Northwestern 
University386 was inappropriate and inequitable, particularly in light 
of the rationales asserted in Trustees of Columbia.387 Looking even 
beyond the flawed rationales identified above, the Board failed to 
carry out its call of applying the NLRA to modern labor complexities 
in order to protect powerless workers.388 Ultimately, in light of the 
recent political shifting, this failure is even more egregious, as 
players are now left without a legitimate claim of joint employment
due to the narrowed state of the standard.389 The Obama-
administration Board should have utilized its rationales from 
Trustees of Columbia390 and exercised jurisdiction over oppressed 
individuals.391
383. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975).
384. See supra Introduction (describing the focus of this Comment as the 
Board’s decisions, not judicial review). 
385. See infra Section IV.C. The former General Counsel of the NLRB 
recognized this when he issued the internal memorandum to the Board’s regional 
directors. See Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 1 (explaining that the  
“Report is intended as a guide for employers, labor unions, and employees that 
summarizes Board law regarding NLRA employee status in the university setting”). 
386. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 17, 
2015). 
387. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 8-14.
388. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979); NLRB v. Ins. 
Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960); NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 
U.S. 357, 362-63 (1958) (calling upon the Board to apply the provisions and 
effectuate the policies of the NLRA to the complexities of the modern workforce). 
389. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip op. 
at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017).
390. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 7. 
391. See Edelman, supra note 150 (stating the decision to pass on 
jurisdiction “was not only fundamentally flawed, but also facilitates the continued 
exploitation of college athletes around the country”). 
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B. Establishing Players as Common-Law Employees of Member 
Institutions 
Should the Board have exercised jurisdiction under the 
principles of Trustees of Columbia,392 the next step would have been 
to identify FBS football players as common-law employees.393 While 
the former General Counsel did argue that private university FBS 
football players are statutory employees, given the modern political 
climate, this opinion is moot.394 A common-law employment 
relationship exists where the employer controls the employees’ work 
and there is an exchange of services for compensation.395 Under this 
definition, the Obama-administration Board should have recognized 
FBS football players are statutory employees based upon the work 
they perform,396 the degree of control imposed upon them,397 and the 
compensation they receive.398
To begin, there is little doubt that FBS football players perform 
a service for their university by engaging in practices and games.399
Through these efforts, the Northwestern football players generated a 
$76 million profit during a decade-long period culminating in 
2013.400 This figure does not even incorporate the extra attention and 
financial donations the University received on account of the 
players’ services.401 In light of such facts, it can hardly be disputed 
392. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 8-14.
393. See id. at 6 (describing the common-law definition of employee). 
394. See Solomon, supra note 241 (describing the memorandum’s 
limitations, as “President Donald Trump will eventually appoint the majority of the 
[B]oard” who does not have to, and likely would not, follow this opinion in a future 
case). 
395. See Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 12.
396. See supra Section I.A (describing the work life of a college football 
player). 
397. See supra Section I.B (detailing how the NCAA and universities control 
every aspect of players’ lives). 
398. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 19 (Aug. 17, 
2015) (stating that the hearing officer found that players “receive a substantial 
economic benefit for playing football”).  
399. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 11-15 (describing the players’
efforts for the program throughout the year); Internal Memorandum, supra note 10,
at 19; McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 100 (describing the players’ time 
commitment to their team and the mission of winning football games). 
400. Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 19. 
401. See id. (finding the players “provided an immeasurable positive impact 
to Northwestern’s reputation”). 
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players contribute a valuable service to their universities through 
football.402
Establishing a university’s control of a FBS football player is 
also relatively straightforward.403 As detailed prior, universities 
exercise an incredible degree of control over their scholarship 
football players,404 such that it is unmatched anywhere else in 
academia.405 To start, football-related activities consume 262 days of 
the year for the players,406 and the players spend forty to sixty hours a 
week on football during the season.407 Beyond time, the universities 
control players’ dietary,408 study,409 and sleep410 habits; what the 
players will wear to the games;411 where they live;412 what car they 
drive;413 when they can leave campus;414 what they post on social 
media;415 their use of alcohol;416 and if they can talk to the media.417
The rampant, deep, and incredible degree of control that universities 
402. See id. (declaring “scholarship football players at Northwestern and 
other Division I FBS private colleges and universities . . . perform services for their 
colleges”). 
403. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 97 (definitively stating 
that “[e]mployee-athletes are subject to an extraordinary degree of control by their 
universities”).
404. See supra Section I.A.
405. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 97 (arguing that, unlike 
other employees, the athletes “are subject virtually every day of the year to 
pervasive control by the athletic department and coaches”).
406. Id. at 103.
407. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 12-14 (Aug. 
17, 2015). Players spend considerable amounts of time on football related activities 
during the offseason as well. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 99 
n.127 (stating that “the daily experience of football players during the season 
mirrors published accounts of off-season life”).
408. See Johnson, supra note 42.
409. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 101.
410. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 20.
411. See id. at 21.
412. See id.
413. See id.
414. See id.
415. See id. This was deemed to be violative of the NLRA by the NLRB’s 
former General Counsel in the Northwestern Advice Memorandum, supra note 19,
at 1.
416. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 21.
417. See id. Northwestern’s policies on media communications were also 
deemed violative of the NLRA in the Northwestern Advice Memorandum. See
Northwestern Advice Memorandum, supra note 19, at 1. 
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exercise over the players’ daily life undermines any misconception 
that players are not employees under the NLRA.418
Finally, in return for the work they contribute to their 
respective universities, the players are compensated with a 
scholarship,419 which is conditioned on their conformance to the rules 
of each member institution and the NCAA.420 Therefore, just as in 
Trustees of Columbia, where graduate student workers were 
compensated through scholarships and recognized as statutory 
employees,421 the players’ receipt of a scholarship acts as a form of 
compensation that is contingent on the services they perform.422 It 
could be argued that players do not receive a traditional form of 
compensation, as a scholarship is inherently distinct from wages, 
salary, or even a stipend.423 However, the common-law employment 
test only requires tangible compensation, and it is hard to imagine 
how an education, books, food, and shelter would not conform to a 
definition of “tangible.”424 This conclusion is supported by the 
former General Counsel’s opinion that there is no doubt that such 
scholarships are compensation.425
Opponents of an employment relationship would certainly 
point to the rationales raised by the Seventh Circuit in its decision to 
418. See, e.g., McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 97 (“[E]mployee-
athletes are subject to more control by their universities than is any other employee 
or group of employees at their institutions.”); Internal Memorandum, supra note 10,
at 19 (expressly stating that schools “control . . . numerous facets of the players’ 
daily lives”). 
419. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 2 (valuing the scholarship at over 
$61,000). 
420. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 109 (contending that 
“athletic scholarships function as contracts of employment, setting forth the 
obligations of employee-athletes and defining the resulting economic compensation 
to be provided,” which are shaped by the rules of the NCAA).  
421. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, slip op. at 21 (Aug. 
23, 2016) (detailing that the scholarships provided to the graduate assistants were 
attached to specific expectations and therefore constituted compensation). 
422. Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 2 (“[T]he scholarship award is subject to 
the player’s compliance with the school’s policies and NCAA’s and Big Ten’s 
regulations.”). 
423. Id. at 2 (“[N]one of the money is directly disbursed to the players.”).
424. Trs. of Columbia, slip op. at 7 (“The Board and the courts have 
repeatedly made clear that the extent of any required ‘economic’ dimension to an 
employment relationship is the payment of tangible compensation.”). 
425. Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 19 (“It is also clear that college 
scholarship football players receive significant compensation in exchange for [a] 
service.”).
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deny student–athletes employee status.426 Particularly, critics can 
claim there is a long-standing tradition of amateurism that has 
defined the alleged economic relationship between student–athletes, 
member institutions, and the NCAA.427 This tradition, in turn, has 
created serious reliance interests by universities and the NCAA, 
ultimately resulting in a complicated system of rules.428 Further, the 
Department of Labor’s characterization of athletics solely as an 
extracurricular activity is an authoritative position on the issue.429
What these arguments neglect, however, is the remarkable 
expansion of modern college football into a multi-billion dollar 
industry and the obvious distinctions from the facts presented in 
Berger v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n.430 Principally, the 
athletes in Berger received no compensation for their athletic efforts 
in accordance with Ivy League standards.431 Thus, the athletes in 
consideration were truly students first, with athletics acting as an 
extracurricular activity.432 Alternatively, FBS football players are 
compensated and receive such payment uniquely on account of their 
athletic, not academic, achievements.433 Further, the athletes in 
Berger, while admirable in their efforts, were not at the core of a 
revenue-generating sport that constitutes a multi-billion dollar 
industry like football players are.434
426. See Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 291-93 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding “as 
a matter of law, that student athletes are not employees”).
427. See id. at 291 (arguing that there is a “long-standing tradition [that] 
defines the economic reality of the relationship between student athletes and their 
schools”). 
428. See id. (“[T]o maintain this tradition of amateurism, the NCAA and its 
member universities and colleges have created an elaborate system of eligibility 
rules.”). 
429. See id. at 292 (reasoning that the Department of Labor’s opinions 
outlined in its Field Operations Handbook “certainly are persuasive. In fact, we have 
cited this handbook as persuasive authority several times”). 
430. See id. at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring) (generally referencing the key 
economic differences). 
431. See id. (acknowledging, unlike the majority, that “the plaintiffs in this 
case did not receive athletic scholarships”).
432. See id. (analogizing the athletes’ performance in the case to those 
associated with “college musicians, actors, journalists, and debaters”).
433. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 15 (Aug. 17, 
2015) (detailing that the players are recruited and compensated principally for their 
athletic ability). 
434. See Berger, 843 F.3d at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring) (distinguishing 
men’s basketball and football on account that those “sports involve billions of 
dollars of revenue for colleges and universities”).  
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Next, the tradition of amateurism is wholly unpersuasive in 
light of the fact that college football is now a revenue sport in which 
there is an inherent economic reality.435 The distinguished tradition of 
amateurism, while once admirable, is now incompatible with the 
incredible revenues generated by FBS programs and the salaries of 
coaches, administrators, and commissioners in modern college 
football.436 Therefore, any purported reliance interests that seek to 
uphold this tradition only further the currently inequitable system.437
Finally, the Department of Labor’s characterization of athletics as an 
extracurricular activity is patently wrong in the context of FBS 
football, as it is academics, not athletics, which is the adjacent 
endeavor for the players.438 In fact, the NLRA explicitly provides 
specified individuals who are exempt from coverage under the Act, 
and college athletes are not among these specified individuals, 
undercutting any theory that their efforts are solely an extracurricular 
activity and cannot constitute a work product.439
Ultimately, the relationship between scholarship FBS football 
players and their respective universities reflects that of a common-
law employment relationship,440 thereby qualifying the players to be 
statutory employees under the NLRA.441 Given this fact, the Board 
should have originally granted jurisdiction to rectify the inequitable 
435. See id. at 294 (questioning whether the court’s “reasoning should 
extend to students who receive athletic scholarships to participate in so-called 
revenue sports like Division I men’s basketball and FBS football”). 
436. See Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 22 (acknowledging that 
“[t]he ‘revered tradition of amateurism in college sports’ and the substantial value of 
a university scholarship are set against the enormous revenue generated by Division 
I FBS football programs and the substantial salaries paid to university 
administrators, coaches, and conference officials involved in the sport”) (quoting 
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)). 
437. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 157 (asserting “NCAA 
rules, promulgated by the university-employers themselves, bar these athletes from 
earning compensation representing their true worth”). 
438. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 15 (describing how players are 
recruited principally for their athletic achievements); McCormick & McCormick, 
supra note 2, at 99-101 (describing players’ time commitments to football, which 
are substantially greater than time spent on academics).  
439. See Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 18. 
440. See id. at 16 (concluding “scholarship football players in Division I FBS 
private sector colleges and universities are employees under the NLRA”). 
441. See Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, slip op. at 5 (Aug. 
23, 2016); Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 16 (identifying that because the 
athletes are employees, they are accorded “the rights and protections of [the 
NLRA]”).
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system in place.442 Its failure to do so was contradicted by its own 
subsequent analyses, 443 which, together with a joint-employment 
claim, provided hope that has now been eliminated by recent Board 
decision making.
C. The NCAA as a Joint Employer Under Browning-Ferris II
Through its 2015 Browning-Ferris II decision, the Obama-
administration Board expanded the joint-employment standard by 
holding that where two entities both hold a common-law 
employment relationship and possess sufficient control over the 
essential terms and conditions of employment, a joint-employment 
relationship exists.444 This liberalized standard opened up the 
argument that the NCAA is a putative employer of FBS college 
football players based on the extensive degree of control it exercises 
over the athletes.445 This claim would have provided a private nexus 
under which FBS football players could unionize and eliminated past 
jurisdictional concerns.446 However, a Republican-majority Board 
recently eradicated this claim by narrowing the joint-employment 
standard.447 Nevertheless, there is an important argument that the 
Obama-administration Board missed: that the NCAA is a joint 
employer under Browning-Ferris II’s inclusive standard.448
442. See Edelman, supra note 150 (arguing the Board’s decision was 
incorrect as a result of the contrast between the incredible affluence that exists at the 
administrative level of college athletics with the fact that 85% of scholarship athletes 
live below the poverty line). 
443. See Trs. of Columbia, slip op. at 1; Internal Memorandum, supra note 
10, at 16. 
444. See Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 2 (Aug. 27, 
2015), overruled by Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip 
op. at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017) (deciding “to revisit and to revise the Board’s joint-
employer standard” in a manner that broadens it and better conforms to the federal 
policy of encouraging collective bargaining). 
445. See supra Section I.B (describing the NCAA as the supervisor of FBS 
football).  
446. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 6 (Aug. 17, 
2015). This, in turn, would eliminate the inherent problem that many athletes, as 
employees for public universities, are subject to state laws that prohibit collective 
bargaining. See id. 
447. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., slip op. at 1 (overturning the 
Board’s more inclusive standard from Browning-Ferris II and returning to a 
requirement of the exercise of direct control).
448. See Lonick, supra note 11, at 137. 
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1. The NCAA as a Common-Law Employer
The first step in establishing joint employment under 
Browning-Ferris II would have been to find a common-law 
employment relationship between the players and the NCAA.449 This 
would have required showing that the players perform a service for 
the NCAA, are compensated for those services, and are under the 
control of the NCAA.450 Careful consideration of the NCAA’s 
symbiotic role with participating members in the multi-billion dollar 
industry of college football confirms the existence of all three 
elements of common-law employment.451
The Board previously confirmed, albeit inadvertently, both 
service by the players and the NCAA’s requisite control when it 
asserted “the NCAA now exercises a substantial degree of control 
over the operations of individual member teams, including many of 
the terms and conditions under which the scholarship players . . . 
practice and play the game.”452 Certainly some, including the 
Seventh Circuit, would deny actual control by the NCAA.453
However, one need only look to the annual NCAA Division I 
Manual to understand how pervasive the NCAA’s control is.454
Indeed, even the NCAA acknowledges in its 414-page manual that 
its principal purpose is to maintain institutional control of 
intercollegiate athletics.455
In response, critics would have reiterated that this control is on 
an institutional level and that the actual relationship between the 
NCAA and the players is “tenuous” at best.456 This analysis, 
however, is simply unsupported by the evidence.457 In truth, the 
NCAA’s control over the daily lives of the players is extensive, and 
449. See Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 2 (prescribing that “the initial inquiry 
is whether there is a common-law employment relationship with the employees in 
question”).
450. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 494 (2004).
451. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 4; Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 
N.L.R.B. No. 90, slip op. at 6 (Aug. 23, 2016). As a point of reminder, the three 
elements are services performed by the employee, compensation, and control by the 
employer. Trs. of Columbia Univ., slip op. at 17. 
452. Northwestern. Univ., slip op. at 4.
453. See Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing the 
relationship between athletes and the NCAA as “tenuous”). 
454. See generally NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 1.2.
455. See id. art. 1.2(b).
456. See Berger, 843 F.3d at 289. 
457. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 4. 
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it includes limits on compensation;458 a requirement of full time 
enrollment;459 a requisite GPA for eligibility;460 a cap on the amount 
of time that can be spent on football-related activities;461 and an 
ability to police individuals for minor violations.462 The former 
General Counsel confirmed the pervasive nature of the NCAA’s 
control on the individual players when he asserted, “NCAA rules [] 
significantly control the activities of . . . FBS scholarship football 
players.”463
Next, FBS football players are compensated via the 
scholarships they receive.464 One can argue that because the 
scholarships do not come from the NCAA, there is no compensation 
so as to render the NCAA an employer.465 Rather, the funding for the 
scholarships comes from the member institutions themselves.466
However, this argument is problematic in two ways. First, it 
would effectively destroy every joint-employment claim produced
because if direct compensation were provided, then the joint-
employment doctrine would not be needed.467 Second, it neglects the 
symbiotic relationship that the Board already recognized in 
Northwestern University.468 It would have been overtly contradictory 
458. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 12.02.2 (limiting 
expenses to a few specified categories, such as meals, lodging, and coaching 
instructions). 
459. See id. art. 14.01.2 (requiring that “a student-athlete shall be enrolled in 
at least a minimum full-time program of studies, be in good academic standing and 
maintain progress toward a baccalaureate or equivalent degree”).  
460. See id. art. 14.4.3.3 (requiring a “Fulfillment of Minimum Grade-Point 
Average Requirements”).
461. See id. art. 17.1 (“General Playing-Season Regulations.”). 
462. See supra Section I.B (detailing specific instances where individual 
players were suspended for menial activities like accepting money for a game worn 
jersey and spending their allotted book money on the wrong items in the bookstore). 
463. Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 16.
464. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 2 (Aug. 17, 
2015). 
465. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 15.01.3 (mandating 
that “[a]ny student who receives financial aid other than that administered by the 
student-athlete’s institution shall not be eligible for intercollegiate athletics 
competition”). 
466. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 2.
467. See Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 5 (Aug. 27, 
2015), overruled by Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, at 1 
(Dec. 14, 2017). For example, it was the general contracting agency, not the putative 
employer, in Browning-Ferris II that provided the direct compensation to the 
employees. See id. at 4.
468. Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 5. 
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for the Board to, on the one hand, accept an argument that the NCAA 
is distanced in an economic context but at the same time concede 
that the NCAA, conferences, and member institutions are effectively 
inseparable.469 Thus, while attenuated, the compensation is directly 
related to both the NCAA and member institutions’ collection of 
massive revenues.470 Therefore, FBS football players are 
compensated for the services they perform and are subsequently 
under the control of the NCAA,471 thereby creating a common-law 
employment relationship.472
2. The NCAA Controls Essential Terms and Conditions of 
Employment
Further, the NCAA fit the definition of a joint employer under 
the Browning-Ferris II standard because of its shared control over 
the essential terms and conditions of the players’ employment.473 In 
Browning-Ferris II, the Board required that the putative employer 
possess a sufficient degree of control over the essential terms and 
conditions of employment.474 Thus, a putative employer could have 
been deemed a joint employer if it shaped decisions related to hiring 
and firing, discipline and supervision, wages, hours, number of 
workers, scheduling control, and the manner and method of work 
performance.475
469. See id. (holding that a decision against an institution directly affects the 
entire NCAA).
470. See Karcher, supra note 2, at 109 n.1. Basically, if a member institution 
is not a part of the NCAA, it necessarily cannot receive financing from the television 
deals made by conferences and the NCAA. See id. 
471. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 2. 
472. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 156-57.
473. See supra Section I.B (describing the NCAA’s supervisory role over the 
entire system of amateurism, which includes both establishing rules and enforcing 
them); see also Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 16 (referencing “NCAA 
rules that significantly control the activities of Division I FBS scholarship football 
players”). 
474. See Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 2 (Aug. 27, 
2015), overruled by Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip 
op. at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017) (stating that if a “common-law employment relationship 
exists, the inquiry then turns to whether the putative joint employer possesses 
sufficient control over employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment to 
permit meaningful collective bargaining”).  
475. See id. at 19. Other issues identified by the Board as matters that are 
essential to the terms and conditions of employment were seniority and overtime. 
See id.
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The NCAA meets this standard.476 To begin, the NCAA shapes 
hiring decisions by dictating the minimum academic standards that 
high school athletes must achieve in order to be “hired” by a college 
football program.477 It also shapes decisions related to discipline and 
control by establishing that athletes will be determined ineligible for 
a multitude of activities, including contact with agents, engaging in 
promotional activities, and accepting outside compensation.478
Additionally, it controls wages by limiting athlete compensation,479
dictating the time athletes can spend practicing,480 and capping the 
number of workers for each institution to eighty-five players.481
Further, it regulates the athletes’ work performance by dictating the 
length of the season, when post-season workouts may occur, whether 
players may participate in camps or clinics,482 and how many coaches 
each institution may have.483
The NCAA exercises its police powers to punish individuals 
and institutions that violate the aforementioned bylaws as well.484 In 
fact, the NCAA Division I Manual intricately describes the NCAA’s 
“infractions program” over the course of twenty-seven pages, 
flaunting its ability impose penalties and sanctions against violating 
476. See id. at 2 (detailing that it “will no longer require that a joint employer 
not only possess the authority to control employees’ terms and conditions of 
employment, but also exercise that authority”).
477. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 14.3. The NCAA 
requires not only that high school athletes take specified classes, but also that they 
achieve minimum standards of grade point average and standardized test scores. See 
id. 
478. See id. art. 12.1 (stating “[a]n individual must comply with the 
following [rules] to retain amateur status”).  
479. See id. art. 15.02.02 (limiting compensation to the “cost of attendance,” 
which only takes into account tuition, room, board, books, transportation, and “other 
expenses related to attendance”). 
480. See id. art. 17.10.2. For example, the NCAA limits mandatory off-
season conditioning to eight hours per week. Id. art. 17.10.6.1.1(e). 
481. See id. art. 15.5.6.1 (mandating that “[t]here shall be . . . an annual limit 
of 85 on the total number of counters (including initial counters) in football at each 
institution”). 
482. See id. art. 17.10. 
483. See id. art. 11.7.4 (limiting the number of coaches to one head coach, 
nine assistant coaches, and four graduate assistant coaches).
484. See Davis & Malagrinò, supra note 117, at 440-43 (detailing, as 
examples, sanctions brought by the NCAA against the University of Southern 
California, the University of Michigan, and Southern Methodist University); see 
also supra Section I.B (explaining sanctions by the NCAA against specified 
individuals). 
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parties.485 Via its routine issuance of sanctions, the NCAA meets the 
standard established in Browning-Ferris II486 by possessing and 
exercising control through its authoritative position.487
Ultimately, the relationship between FBS football players, the 
NCAA, and member institutions reflected a joint-employment 
relationship under the inclusive Browning-Ferris II standard.488 Such 
a finding of joint employment would have created a medium for all 
FBS players, not just those attending private institutions, to unionize, 
thus eliminating a major policy concern cited by Northwestern 
University.489 Accordingly, this would have given exploited 
individuals a voice in a system that has deprived them of sharing in 
the fruits of their labor for far too long.490 However, by passing on 
jurisdiction in Northwestern University,491 the Obama-administration 
Board failed to take action against a system of gross exploitation.492
Instead, the argument that could have been used to combat the farce 
system of amateurism has come and gone, with the Board’s new, 
more restrictive standard effectively eliminating any legitimate claim 
of joint employment.493
D. Hy-Brand Industries and Its Effect on Future Unionization Efforts
The recent shift in the political makeup of the Board likely 
solidified the continuation of exploitation in the NCAA by 
485. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 19.01.2 (explaining 
that the “infractions program shall hold institutions, coaches, administrators and 
student-athletes who violate the NCAA constitution and bylaws accountable for 
their conduct, both at the individual and institutional levels”). 
486. See Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 2 (Aug. 27, 
2015), overruled by Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip 
op. at 1 (Dec. 14, 2017) (declaring “[r]eserved authority to control terms and 
conditions of employment, even if not exercised, is clearly relevant to the joint-
employment inquiry”).
487. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 19.01.1 (describing 
how its infractions program will exercise its authority and “prescribe appropriate 
and fair penalties if violations occur”).
488. See Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 2; Lonick, supra note 11, at 137.
489. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 3 (Aug. 17, 
2015) (discussing jurisdictional limits of the NLRB).
490. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 89, 156-57 (explaining 
the deprivation of student–athletes).
491. See Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 3 (passing on jurisdiction).
492. See Edelman, supra note 150 (explaining the exploitation of college 
athletes).
493. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip op. 
at 1-2 (Dec. 14, 2017) (holding that the employers were joint employers).
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foreclosing any potential claim of joint employment by the 
athletes.494 The Board’s recent decision in Hy-Brand Industries495 and 
historical approach toward student unionization suggests that any 
future attempt of unionization by college football players would not 
be looked upon favorably.496 Ultimately, the decision making by both 
political parties is subject to criticism and once again leaves players 
voiceless. 
Broadly speaking, the Board would dismiss the claim of joint 
employment against the NCAA, arguing it is contrary to the 
congressional intent of the NLRA and would not promote peaceful 
resolution of labor disputes as required by the Act.497 In fact, the 
claim would be a model example of the dissent’s arguments in 
Browning-Ferris II498 and the Board’s recent decision in Hy-Brand 
Industries, where conservative Board members vehemently argued 
against such an extension of joint employment.499 To the current 
Board, a recognition of joint employment for college football players 
would be yet another attempt to pull an entity into a labor dispute 
that it is not directly connected to.500
494. See Members of the NLRB, supra note 9 (providing links to each 
division of the NLRB and its members). 
495. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., at 6 (describing the Board’s 
decision). 
496. See supra Section II.B (detailing Republican Boards’ approach toward
student unionization); Northwestern Univ., slip op. at 1 (passing on jurisdiction). 
497. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., slip op. at 8, 11, 29, 44 
(describing how Browning-Ferris II was against congressional intent); Browning-
Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 16 (Aug. 27, 2015) overruled by Hy-
Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., slip op. at 13, 16 (stating that all joint-employment 
claims must promote peaceful resolution of labor disputes via collective bargaining). 
498. See Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 21 (Members Miscimarra and 
Johnson, dissenting) (reasoning the Browning-Ferris II standard “will subject 
countless entities to unprecedented new joint-bargaining obligations that most do not 
even know they have”). 
499. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., slip op. at 9 (“Nor is there any 
discernible limit on the Browning-Ferris majority’s open-ended, multifactor 
standard, which is an analytical grab bag from which any scrap of evidence . . . 
could suffice to prove that multiple entities collectively comprise a joint employer, 
whether they numbered two or two dozen.”).
500. See id. at 30 (“Browning-Ferris’ expansion of the joint-employer 
doctrine swept many more entities into primary-employer status as to labor disputes 
that are not directly their own. As a result, unions were enabled to picket or apply 
other coercive pressure to either or both of the joint employers as they chose.”); 
Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 25 (Members Miscimarra and Johnson, dissenting) 
(arguing that the Browning-Ferris II standard would create “confusion and disarray[, 
which] threaten[] to cause substantial instability in bargaining relationships”).
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FBS football players could argue that, due to the incredible 
amount of control the NCAA possesses, the NCAA even falls under 
the more restrictive standard from Hy-Brand Industries.501 In fact, the 
players may hold a persuasive argument that the NCAA’s control is 
“direct and immediate.”502 After all, the NCAA seemingly exercises 
direct control by using its authority to punish individual players and 
set conditions on all players’ eligibility requirements.503
However, the Board would have two responses to this claim. 
First, it would not be surprising for the current Republican Board to 
retreat from Trustees of Columbia,504 as Republican Boards have 
historically found that students cannot be employees, and this Board 
has already shown a willingness to disagree with the Obama-
administration Board’s decisions.505 Second, even if football players 
were considered employees, the Board could point to its discussion 
of franchises and general contractors in Hy-brand Industries.506
While the NCAA does hold a certain degree of control, analogous to 
that of the franchisor or a homeowner who sets conditions on an 
independent contractor’s employees, the Board would reiterate, 
“Congress did not intend that every entity with some degree of 
economic relationship with the employer-disputant be thrown into its 
labor dispute.”507 In other words, the Board would reason the control 
501. See Hy-Brand Indus., slip op. at 1 (promulgating a more restrictive 
standard); supra Section I.B (describing the NCAA’s control). 
502. Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., slip op. at 1. 
503. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 18, art. 19.01.2 (explaining 
that the “infractions program shall hold institutions, coaches, administrators and 
student-athletes who violate the NCAA constitution and bylaws accountable for 
their conduct, both at the individual and institutional levels”).
504. See generally Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. 
No. 90, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 23, 2016). 
505. See Semuels, supra note 262 (explaining the varying political views on 
student collective bargaining rights); supra Section II.B (describing the historical 
political disagreement over student unionization). See generally Hy-Brand Indus.,
slip op. (overturning an Obama-administration Board’s decision after two years).
506. Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., slip op. at 30 (“[A]ssuming that a 
franchisor exerts similar indirect control over each franchisee, a union could picket 
the franchisor and all franchisees even though its dispute only involves the 
employees of one franchisee.”).
507. Id. The Board specifically criticized the applicability of a broad 
standard on the construction industry, saying that “a general contractor in the 
construction industry is not an ‘employer’ of subcontractor employees, even though 
general contractors obviously have ‘reserved’ control over most if not all work 
performed by subcontractor employees on construction projects.” See id. 
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is too attenuated and not under the scope of the Act as 
congressionally intended.508
However, the problem with the Republican Board’s narrow 
view of the NLRA is that it does contravene the core purpose of the 
Act: the resolution of labor disputes via peaceful settlements in order 
to protect vulnerable workforces.509 The Supreme Court has specified 
that the Board possesses congressionally delegated authority to adapt 
the provisions of the NLRA to the fluctuating nature of modern 
workforces.510 Therefore, it is the Board’s sole responsibility to 
implement the provisions of the Act in order to protect employees 
who are subject to a system that has been labeled as a dictatorship511
and a farce.512 In fact, to allow the continuance of an exploitive 
system of amateurism in the face of the obvious emergence of a 
multi-billion dollar industry513 would be directly contrary to the 
purposes of the NLRA expressed by the Act514 and the Supreme 
Court.515 If the true goal of the NLRA is resolution of labor disputes 
508. Id. (“[T]he uncertainty created by Browning-Ferris’ vague standard 
created an unreasonable risk that . . . other parties would discover that they 
unlawfully injected themselves into collective bargaining involving another 
employer and its union(s), based on a relationship that turned out to be insufficient 
to result in joint-employer status.”). 
509. Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 16 (Aug. 27, 
2015), overruled by Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., slip op. at 1; Edelman, 
supra note 150 (stating “Congress passed the [NLRA] in 1935 to ensure that 
otherwise powerless employees would enjoy better terms and conditions than if each 
employee were to bargain independently”).
510. See Browning-Ferris II, slip op. at 15 (detailing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that established the Board’s job is to apply the Act to fluid and 
complex industrial structures). 
511. See Nocera & Strauss, supra note 27 (referencing Kain Colter’s 
proclamation the NCAA’s structure “resembles a dictatorship, where the NCAA 
places their rules and regulations on these students without their input or without 
their negotiation”). 
512. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 157 (describing the 
label of student–athlete as “farcical”). 
513. See id. at 76, 157. 
514. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (providing that the NLRA was intended to 
“encourage[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting 
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating 
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection”).
515. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979) (labeling 
the primary responsibility of the Board to be “that of ‘applying the general 
provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life’”) (quoting NLRB v. Erie 
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963)); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 
379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964). 
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via peaceful settlements,516 it is inexcusable for the Board to permit 
the NCAA and member institutions to continue to impose their 
requirements without the slightest input from the laborers.517
Unfortunately, the Board missed its chance to right the wrongs 
inherent in college football, and now the exploitation will endure for 
the foreseeable future.518
CONCLUSION
The motivation behind the Northwestern football players’ 
attempt to unionize in 2014 was not rooted in greed or a desire for 
attention; rather, the players desired to gain a voice in a system they 
considered to be a dictatorship.519 However, the Board denied such 
an opportunity for the players by choosing to pass on exercising 
jurisdiction, rationalizing that it did not want to create labor unrest.520
What the Board utterly failed to consider, however, is that there is 
already labor unrest of the highest severity—exploitation.521 Toward 
the end of Barack Obama’s presidential term, his appointed Board 
members took action that suggested a change in college athletics 
might be forthcoming.522 Unfortunately, the Obama-administration 
Board was not swift enough, ultimately giving way to political 
modifications that led to the foreclosure of a persuasive argument 
that the NCAA is a joint employer under the NLRA.523 Looking 
516. See Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 16 (Aug. 27, 
2015), overruled by Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156 (Dec. 
14, 2017). 
517. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 79 (contending “the 
relationship between scholarship athletes and their colleges and universities can no 
longer be fairly characterized as anything other than an employment relationship in 
which the athletes serve as employees and the institutions for which they labor as 
their employers”).
518. See Edelman, supra note 150.
519. See Nocera & Strauss, supra note 27 (noting the players’ belief that the 
current system has marginalized them).  
520. See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 17, 
2015).
521. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 2, at 157 (arguing the label 
of student–athlete “obscure[es] the reality of [the players’] exploitation”); supra 
Section I.B (describing the NCAA’s astonishing financial state). 
522. See e.g., Browning-Ferris II, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. at 1 (Aug. 
27, 2015), overruled by Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156 
(Dec. 14, 2017); Trs. of Columbia, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, slip op. at 10 (Aug. 23, 
2016); Internal Memorandum, supra note 10, at 22.
523. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., slip op. at 1; supra Section 
IV.D. 
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back, it is safe to say this oversight may have cost college football 
players their escape from exploitation and that the Board has failed 
to protect some of the nation’s most vulnerable employees.524
524. See Edelman, supra note 150.
